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ABSTRACT
A prime motivation for the establishment of the Economic
Community of West African States in 1975, was for the purpose
of building the industrial capacity of the sub-region.
Industrialization was believed to be the engine of economic
growth, and a key to transforming the traditional economies of
the sixteen member-states. Integration of member economies was
to be the means through which achieving industrialization, and
thus the structural change in the economies of West Africa
could be realized.
However, the forming of this economic union has not produced
the desired results, despite the ample resource endowment of
the sub-region. With very few exceptions, the secondary sector
in West Africa is still in a rudimentary state, consisting
mainly of low-technology import substitution industries. There
still exists a pattern of production that concentrates heavily
on few primary export products, and there is almost a complete
absence of highly sophisticated technology or heavy
engineering industries.
Given the rudimentary state of industrialization in West
Africa, one begins to question the contribution ECOWAS has
made in promoting sustained and accelerated development in the
sub-region. ECOWAS has made a few modest achievements,
particularly in the area of infrastructural development.
However, the organization has been confronted with a number of
problems which it must solve if the organization is to become
viable. Of the most important are the perceived constraints
integration imposes on national sovereignty, and
the issue concerning a fair and equitable distribution of the
benefits among member countries. The prospects for success of
the organization can be greatly increased through the
formation of certain institutions and mechanisms which would
address these policy issues.
THESIS SUPERVISOR: ALICE AMSDEN
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Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to examine the viability of the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in
promoting industrialization and development in the West
African sub-region. Industrialization is widely believed to be
one of the most reliable means of raising a country's standard
of living. African colonies, particularly those in West
Africa, achieved independence at a time when their economies
were still highly dependent and unintegrated, both internally
and between countries. But as the former colonies gained the
political independence to pursue their own development
strategies, they turned their attention to one of the most
glaring gaps between their economies and those of the former
colonial powers: industrial production. In fact, Africa's
post-independence strategy concentrated on creating industrial
capacity.
African leaders' interest in industrialization to achieve
greater economic independence stems partly from policies that
fostered the dependence of the ex-colonies on the metropolitan
countries, especially for manufactures. (WB Tech. Paper #25:
1984) Industrialization was believed to be the engine of
economic growth and the key to transforming traditional
economies--partly because the prospects for commodity exports
were poor and partly because of a strong desire to reduce
dependence on manufactured imports. It was seen as a means of
reducing market dependence, and heightened by a desire to
escape declining terms of trade. The growth potential of
industrialization was a common theme of many development
plans, which stressed a higher standard of living through
economic growth as a primary objective.
For the purposes of this study, industrialization will be
narrowly defined as the process by which an economy develops
from one that predominantly produces agricultural products to
one in which manufacturing, and increased value added through
processing, represents an important share of total gross
domestic product (GDP). The close relationship between
industrialization and development have been provided in the
analytical frameworks of Chenery and Syrquin', who state that
"not only is there a strong statistical association between
the rise of industry and the level of per capita income, but
virtually all countries that have achieved a high living
standards by any measure have also industrialized to a
substantial degree". The basic premise being that if the
objective is to accelerate the overall rate of economic
development, we must have manufacturing production rising much
faster than GDP, and this has to be reflected in an
increasingly dominant role of manufacturing industry to the
whole economy. However, the impact of the manufacturing
industry on the economy depends on the structure of
composition of manufacturing output as well as the linkage
H.B. Chenery and M. Syrquin: "Comparative Analysis of Industrial
Growth", presented at the 5th World Congress of the International Economic
Association, Tokyo, Aug./Sept., 1977.
effects to other sectors of manufacturing production.
(Diejomaoh: 1980)
The perceived growth potential inherent in the
industrialization process partially explains why less
developed countries (LDCs) pursued the goal of building
industrial capacity with such determination and
singlemindedness. It is also likely that the improved
prospects of rapid industrialization was a primary reason for
the formation of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS). One of the most unifying forces in West Africa that
grows from the common interests of states is the desire to
industrialize. Industrialization, in fact, is often the
outcome expected by member states that agree to regional
integration initiatives. In short, regional integration is
viewed by these states as being a force through which
structural change in the region's economies can be realized.
It is in the context of national industrialization, coupled
with trade expansion and long-run economic growth in general,
that individual member states of ECOWAS are likely to identify
their economic interests with the larger community. Therefore,
it is not farfetched to assume that the fate of ECOWAS will
largely be determined by how much the organization contributes
to increased industrialization and, hence, the rapid
development in West Africa.
However, the multiplicity of integration groupings and the
belief in economic consolidation as one of the solutions to
development obstacles seem to be in contradiction with the
experiences of economic integration in Africa since
independence. In general, contrary to the projections of
traditional theories of customs unions, these integration
efforts have neither facilitated the expansion of trade among
member states, nor been responsible for the acceleration of
the growth rate of the respective economies. (Gogue: 1986) On
the whole, even though upon attainment of political
independence industrialization has been a major economic
policy in all ECOWAS countries, the record of achievement has
been dismal, especially when studied against the background of
resources which have been poured into this sector. (Asante:
1986) Therefore, if we accept that the theory of economic
integration offers an impressive list of benefits and economic
pay-offs which could help accelerate industrialization, the
question now becomes why have integration schemes in the
developing areas performed so poorly considering their lofty
expectations. The problem areas and constraints encountered by
ECOWAS when promoting industrialization in West Africa should
shed light upon the effectiveness, viability, and potential
success of economic associations in developing countries.
The study will be divided into five chapters. Chapter one is
will introduce the neo-classical theory of customs union, it's
criticisms, and it's applicability in the developing countries
context. The second portion of chapter one will also be used
to introduce the ECOWAS; it's aims, institutions, and
decision-making processes. This information is meant to both
acquaint the reader to the theory which gave impetus to the
formation of the West African customs union, and introduce the
ECOWAS organization itself.
Chapter two is divided into three sections, in an attempt to
give a general overview of the physical characteristics of the
sub-region, and to give a sense of the extent that resource-
based development can be achieved in West Africa. The first
section will focus on the existing resource base for
industrialization in Africa West Africa, including climate,
agricultural potential, mineral reserves, and human resources.
These are important because the pace and structure of
industrial development in the sub-region will be dependent on
these factor endowments. With the existing resources in mind,
the second section of the chapter will be devoted to the
productive sector performance since independence, particularly
in agriculture and industry. Their performances will show how
efficiently the resources of the sub-region are being used, as
well as general growth trends in the West African economies as
compared to overall trends in Sub-Saharan Africa. The third
section will analyze why these sectors has performed so
poorly, with special attention given to the failure of the
import substitution strategy adopted by many West African
nations upon independence.
Chapter three will also be divided into three sections, for
the purpose of examining the present industrial status of each
member-state in ECOWAS. The sixteen nations of the
organization are grouped into either the category of
"industrially advanced" or the "less-industrially advanced".
These groupings are meant to distinguish the level of
development and number of industries in each country. A third
section of chapter three will be devoted to identifying trends
and commonalities which characterize the nations of ECOWAS.
Chapter four will give the contributions of the organization
toward industrialization, as well as identify some of the
major constraints and problem areas the organization has
confronted in trying to promote industrialization in the sub-
region. Finally, concluding remarks will focus on those
constraints which particularly hamper industrial progress in
the region and what policy prescriptions can be made to limit
their impact.
CHAPTER ONE
The Neo-classical Theory of Customs Union
Since the late fifties and early sixties there have been
numerous formations of regional groupings, particularly in
Latin America, Asia, and Africa, aimed at achieving closer
economic cooperation and integration. In the West African sub-
region there are now several multilateral, bilateral, and
special economic arrangements of this sort designed to achieve
some sectoral or functional goal. The growing interest in
regional cooperation in developing areas, both at the economic
and political levels, stem from internal and external factors.
Among the internal factors, perhaps the most dominant have
been the realization that the relatively small size of many
African nation, their uneven resource endowments, small size
of their markets, and the distortions in the pattern of
economic activity inherited from the colonial period seriously
inhibits attempts at development purely on a national scale.
Under the present circumstances, many African states cannot
afford to accomplish the financial requirements of growth and
development in a short period of time. Moreover, economic
development has been limited not only by the lack of
development capital, but by the small size of the national
market, where market size is not only a function of population
but of purchasing power. It is rare to find a state in Sub-
Saharan Africa with a budget that can meet the requirements of
economic development without sacrificing other vital national
projects. Internal economic weaknesses at independence has
resulted in a continued reliance on external assistance. The
interest in cooperation has also been reinforced by political
considerations, the central theme being the desire to present
a collective African front in matters affecting the continent
as a whole. In this regard, regional integration is both
appealing and necessary.
Bela Ballassa has broadly defined integration as a state or
process of suppression of discrimination between economic
units of nation states. Thus, the level and scope of
integration depends on the level of restrictions on trade
removed, so that the more restrictions that are removed
between economic units, the higher the level of integration.
Ballassa has identified five principle types of economic
associations.2 Any of these may involve two or more countries
as member states who regard other countries as non-member
third countries. They are: 1) Preferential Areas, 2) Free
Trade Areas, 3) Customs Union, 4) Common Market, and 5)
Economic Union. Preferential areas are the loosest form of
association. The members of a preferential area simply agree
to grant one another favorable tariff treatment than they give
other countries. All tariffs are not abolished, as in a free
trade area, but mutual tariffs are lower than those applied to
imports from other countries.- In a customs union all tariffs
2 See Bela Ballassa, The Theory of Economic Integration. R.D. Irwin,
Homewood, Illinois, 1961.
and other restrictions on trade among member countries are
abolished and a common external tariff is applied for all
imports originating in countries outside the union. A common
market is an area within which there are no artificial
barriers to the free movement of goods, persons and services.
There is also usually a supranational organization whose
authority regarding specific issues all member states are
obliged to obey. The last and tightest form of economic
association is an economic union. This type of association
possesses all the properties of a customs union, including the
removal of all obstacles to free internal movement of labor
and capital. Also, the economic, financial, and some social
policies are coordinated and a single supranational
organization conducts new relations with third countries. The
coordination of all policies transforms the union into a
political form, one which ECOWAS hopes it will eventually
evolve into.
Traditionally, customs unions are analyzed within the
general equilibrium framework of neo-classical trade theory.
This approach relies heavily on neoclassical assumptions of
full employment, perfect competition, constant returns to
scale, perfect internal mobility of factors of production and
equality of private and social costs (Olofin: 1977). The
traditional theory of economic integration, popularized by
Vin'er (1950)3, evaluates the desirability of customs unions
3 See Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue, NY. 1950
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from the viewpoint of global welfare considerations within a
static framework.
There are certain expectations of benefits held by nations
as a result of participating in regional economic integration
schemes. The orthodox comparative static analysis based on the
customs union theory of Viner attributes such gains to
increased production arising from specialization according to
static comparative advantage, that is, essentially to static
resource allocation gains. (Robson: 1983) The theory centers
on the analysis of trade creation and diversion effects of a
customs union. Trade creation refers to the shift from higher-
cost domestic products in favor of the lower-cost products of
member states. This reduces the cost for goods previously
produced domestically. Trade diversion refers to a shift in
the source of imports from low-cost sources outside the
regional block to a higher-cost source within. In theory, by
removing the trade barriers to form the union, competition
will ensue among similar industries in the member states as
they produce for an enlarged union market. This competition
will lead to a pattern of specialization in which each country
produces and supplies to the other members of the union the
products in which it has a comparative advantage. It is
expected that these actions would produce an expansion of
intra-community trade, greater independence from the world
market and the industrialized countries, and an acceleration
of growth and development. The merits of integration are thus
10
evaluated using the relative magnitudes of trade creation and
trade diversion as the sole criterion.
According to the theory, customs unions are beneficial only
when they lead to trade creation. In Viner's view, if there is
more trade diversion than trade creation within a customs
union, then the net effect on world welfare and the welfare of
member states will be negative. Because trade diversion, (at
least in the short run) will obviously prevail over trade
creation in Third World customs unions as members shift from
low cost producer's in the developed world to high cost
producers among their neighbors, Viner denied that integration
schemes will benefit developing countries. (Sloan: 1972)
However, the traditional core of this theory, which focuses
on the static resource and production reallocation effects
within highly integrated and flexible industrialized nations,
is of limited value to contemporary developing nations intent
on building up their industrial base. (Todaro: 1977) For trade
creation to occur the potential union members must already be
relatively industrialized, have complementary rather than
competitive economies, and have a relatively low foreign trade
to GNP. Most writers concerned with the problems of the Third
World have rejected the neo-classical trade and customs union
theory based on the fact that conditions in the developing
countries are strikingly different from those that exist in
the developed world on which the established theoretical
framework for economic integration has been based. In the
European Economic Community (EEC), the principle economic
motivation was to aid the development of already established
industries in highly industrialized countries through trade
expansion and increased competition. Highly developed price
systems and industrial structures in Western Europe allowed
all to benefit from the effects of intra-industry
specialization. The predominance of infrastructure
similarities discouraged the concentration of foreign
investments in any single member-unit, and the existence of
highly developed transport and communications facilities
helped promote intra-regional exchange. (Hansen: 1968) Thus,
developed nations could afford to treat economic integration
as a matter of welfare politics because each started from a
significantly industrialized base.
Toward a Theory of Developmental Regionalism4
Some development economists have argued that the problems of
economic integration among developing nations should be
analyzed within the context of development planning rather
than as a branch of tariff theory, which deals solely with the
effects of geographically discriminatory changes in tariff
barriers. The reason being that the traditional theory comes
from a standpoint of free trade, so any gains derive from the
move toward free trade involving the reduction or elimination
inefficient or high cost domestic industries. If this was the
* Term coined from John W. Sloan. "The Strategy of Developmental
Regionalism. Journal of Common Market Studies: vol. 10, 1971-72.
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sole objective of integration and the main source of gain
derived from it, even greater gains could be obtained by
reducing tariffs on a non-discriminatory basis, or by removing
protection for domestic enterprises altogether, and by
importing the domestic requirements of products in displaced
industries from outside at world market prices. (Robson: p.6)
However, the analysis of economic integration in the Third
World starts from an entirely different developmental
standpoint. The basic economic rational for the gradual
integration of less developed economies is a long term dynamic
one. The static argument against economic integration ignores
the fact that static trade diversion may eventually turn out
to be dynamic trade creation given the addition of local jobs
and circular flows of income created because of potential
economies of scale within the enlarged market. Given the small
population size of many of the least developed countries
(LDCs), the majority of Third World countries can not offer
economies of scale to many industries within their national
boundaries. Unless volume of sales reach a certain minimum,
cost per unit and price to the consumer will be high relative
to their capacity to compete with other similar industries
both within the region and outside of it. Since production
costs in may industries decline steadily as output increases,
large market outlets are indispensable, particularly if modern
production methods are to be taken advantage of. In the
absence of integration, each separate country may not provide
13
a sufficiently large domestic market to enable local
industries to lower their production costs through economies
of scale. (Todaro: p.315)
By enlarging the market, economic integration can increase
the possibility of specialization and increased efficiency,
benefits also acknowledged in the traditional theory. As each
nation decreases domestic protective policies within the
union, enterprises would be compelled to produce more
efficiently in order to ward off regional competitors.
Increased competition within the union would serve to as an
incentive for enterprises to increase production and lower
prices, with the hope of eventually producing for export.
Assured of a market beyond national boundaries, new plants may
be located in the countries where particular products can be
produced most efficiently. (Sloan: p.145) What the traditional
theory does ignore, however, is the fact that by removing the
barriers to trade and enlargening the market, the opportunity
of developing a region-wide complementary industrial structure
through coordinated industrial planning is created.
A second argument in favor of regional economic integration
centers around the need to protect infant industry. (Onwuka:
1982) In the expanded union, industry remains a high-cost
producer by comparison with the rest of the world, even
allowing for the utilization of economies of scale. In this
regard, it is assumed that there is a valid case for
protecting certain activities in the developing countries from
14
external competition--particularly newly formed industry--
either for the purpose of increasing income, growth rate, or
in order to attain certain non-economic objectives that are
sought for their own sake.
Finally, it is hoped that economic integration in the
developing areas will serve as a means of reducing the
external vulnerability of developing economies and improve the
bargaining power of the regional powers with the
industrialized countries. Regional economic integration would
hopefully break the dependent relationship by aiding each
member nation to export manufactured goods and eventually
capital goods to their neighbors.
In summary, the benefits that integration could provide in
the developing areas are those which are made possible by the
expanded market size, including the opportunity to promote
both industries which have not yet been established to develop
under protection, as well as those that have to take advantage
of the economies of large scale production. Regardless of it's
net trade-creation effects, a customs union may still be
considered desireable from the viewpoint of member countries,
if it results in an increase in the relative welfare of member
countries. Economic integration among developing countries is
designed to expand trade, encourage new industries, help
diversify national economies, and to increase the region's
bargaining power with the developed nations. But, neither
increased trade nor economic efficiency need be an end in
itself. The dominant factors in economic integration in the
Third World are not the gains which follow from the fusion of
national markets. The goal is the achievement of lasting
industrial and economic development of nation-states within
the organization, with an indirect benefit of increased
efficiency and intra-regional trade. The main advantages of
economic union lie in ensuring or promoting the integration of
the resource base of the region and the consequent possibility
this creates for an extension of the production frontier of
the region and its member countries. (Brewster and Thomas:
1970) It is envisaged that developmental regionalism would
essentially transform the economies of member states into a
more integrated and rational regional economy capable of
generating a self-sustained period of economic growth.
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, one may make the
assumption that there could be ample theoretical
justifications for the formation of a West African economic
association. The awareness that economic cooperation could be
of great importance in accelerating economic development led
to the formation of the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), on May 28, 1975. The next section will
examine the ECOWAS' aims and objectives, institutional
structure, and decision-making processes.
ECOWAS: Aims and Objectives
Because of the practical difficulties involved in forming
economic groupings among independent states, especially less
developed ones, it took West African countries ten years to
form ECOWAS from the time of the United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa (UNECA) resolution in 1965 recommending
that member states of the Commission form the
intergovernmental machinery for harmonizing economic
development. The period of 1965-72 was characterized by
hesitation, vacillation, and politicking, despite all the
institutional support which the UNECA gave by organizing
research and conferences on economic integration in West
Africa. (Ezenwe: 1983) The direct negotiations leading to the
formation of ECOWAS began in April 1972 when the Heads of
State of Nigeria and Togo decided to revive the idea of an
economic community which would: cut across linguistic and
cultural barriers; be pragmatic and flexible in it's approach;
and have the ability to deal with specific issues in a timely
fashion. (Asante: p.55) A series of meetings and intense
diplomatic maneuvers followed the Nigeria-Togo initiative,
which culminated in the signing of the ECOWAS Treaty in Lagos,
Nigeria on May 28th, 1975 where fifteen Heads of State
assembled to endorse the document. The Treaty came into effect
during the first quarter of 1977. The membership of ECOWAS
includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Gambia,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger,
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Cape Verde has since
joined the Community as the sixteenth member.
Cognizant of impediments to regional integration,
particularly in the developing areas, West African leaders
made difficult compromises by adopting a treaty that would
allay the fears of member-states and satisfy their different
aspirations. The ECOWAS Treaty contains 64 articles arranged
into fourteen chapters. The ambitious Clause 65 of Article II
states the organization is expected to standardize tariffs and
trade procedures of member countries. Specifically, the
sixteen member community aspires:
... to promote cooperation and development in
all fields of economic activity particularly in
industry, transport, telecommunication, energy,
agriculture, natural sciences, commerce,
monetary and financial questions, and in social
and cultural matters for the purpose of raising
the standard of living of it's peoples,
increasing and maintaining economic stability,
fostering closer relations among it's members
and contributing to progress and development of
the African continent.5
To this end the Community will by stages ensure, among other
things: the elimination of customs duties and other charges of
equivalent effect between member-states in respect to the
importation and exportation of goods; the elimination of
quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade; the
establishment of a common customs tariff and commercial policy
toward third countries; the abolition of the free movement of
persons, services, and capital between member states; the
harmonization of agricultural, industrial, and monetary
5 See the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States.
Lagos, Nigeria, 1975. Article II.
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policies; the implementation of schemes for joint development
of transport, communications, energy and other infrastructural
facilities, as well as the evolution of a common policies in
these fields; and finally the establishment of a Fund for
Cooperation, Compensation, and Development. (Ezenwe: p.127)
The Treaty also provides for some specific goals and
provisions for realizing these declared objectives and a
fifteen year transitional period for these goals to be
achieved. The first stage, to last for two years, involves
freezing of import duties and a consolidation of customs
duties by all ECOWAS members. During a second period of eight
years members would undertake to eliminate their import duties
on goods produced in ECOWAS. During a final period of five
years members could unify their external tariffs against non-
ECOWAS countries. It was hoped that within this lengthy period
all existing barriers to free trade would have been gradually
whittled away and finally eliminated, and the organization
finally becoming an Economic Union. However, ECOWAS was
preoccupied during the first four years with staffing and
complex administrative problems, so the organization got off
to a delayed start. The Treaty itself was lacking in detail,
with only broad outlines contained in the document, therefore
the early period was directed toward making ECOWAS
institutionally operational. The current achievements of the
org-anization will be examined in a later chapter.
ECOWAS: Institutional Framework and Decision-making Process
The process of integration necessitates creation of suitable
institutions to deal with the complex problems of linking
economic destinies of several nations. The Lagos Treaty
recognized development of adequate institutional machinery as
an essential condition for successful coordination of
development policies. Similarly, the coordination of
industrial development policies and harmonization of national
development plans provided for in the Treaty cannot be
achieved if there are no adequate institutional arrangements
to take the coordinating role. (Asante: p.64) The
institutional framework of ECOWAS is outlined below:
-The highest decision-making organ of the ECOWAS is the
Authority of Heads of State and Government, which is charged
with administering and directing the integrative movement of
the Community. Composed of one representative from each member
state, this supreme organ (which meets once a year), is
responsible for, is to give general direction to, and control
the performance of the executive functions of the Community.
The "Authority" determines it's own procedures and conduct of
business. Decisions and directions of the Authority is binding
on all institutions of the Community.
-The ECOWAS Authority is assisted by the Council of
Ministers, which consists of two representatives of each
member state--acts in an advisory capacity to the Authority.
The responsibilities of the Council are to keep under review
the functioning and development of the Community in accordance
with the Treaty; make recommendations to the Authority on
policy matters aimed at the efficient and harmonious
functioning and development of the Community; and to give
directions to all subordinate institutions. The decisions and
directions of the Council are binding on all subordinate
institutions.
-The third most important institution of ECOWAS is the
Executive Secretariat. It is the machinery of execution headed
by an executive secretary who is the Community's chief
executive officer, who is assisted by two deputies appointed
by the Council of Ministers. The Executive Secretary is
appointed by the Authority to serve a four-year term, with the
possibility of being re-appointed for one further term of
similar length, or being removed from office on the
recommendations of the Council. The Secretariat is responsible
for the day to day operations of the Community and it's
institutions.
-In addition to the Authority, Council, and Executive
Secretariat, there are four technical and specialized
Commissions in ECOWAS, namely the Trade, Customs Immigration,
Monetary and Payment Commission; the Transport,
Telecommunication and Energy Commission; the Industry,
Agriculture and Natural Resources Commission, and the Social
and Cultural Affairs Commission. Each of these are composed of
experts from all the member states and their duty is to draw
up programs in their relevant fields and assess the
implementation of such programs. They prepare reports and
submit recommendations to the Council through the Executive
Secretary. Although as advisory bodies they lack authoritative
decision-making power, their role may prove significant, as
they serve as a bridge between national governments and the
private sector. (Okolo: 1985)
-In view of the complex problems which may arise in the
process of harmonizing the economies of sixteen countries with
different systems at various stages of development, the Treaty
envisages the establishment of a Tribunal (Article II) to
ensure the observance of law and justice in the
interpretations of the Treaty's provisions and to settle
disputes referred to it. It is not clear, however, how the
tribunal can make it's interpretations binding in the absence
of a supra-national law enforcement agency.
The decision-making process of ECOWAS would seem to
constitute one of the most contentious areas of economic
groupings, especially with an organization with such an all-
embracing, broad-based, if not fuzzy goals. The hierarchical
structure of the institutions of ECOWAS show that decisions
have to be taken to various levels: initially to the technical
commissions and then to the Council of Ministers, culminating
in final consideration of any major issue by the Authority.
(Asante: p.69) However, since there is no provision for voting
under the Treaty, it is not made clear which institution is
empowered to make a formal proposal as a first step in the
decision-making process. Apart from the Fund for Cooperation
and Development, whose Board of Directors settle matters by
simple majority rule, at each level of decision-making the
unstated principle of unanimity applies. In other words, the
Community's institutions should at each level strive to
appease each member state, as the interests of each must be
taken into consideration.
Apart from the unanimity rule, the powers of the Community
to bind member-states to it's decisions are almost non-
existent, irrespective of the level the decision is made, for
ECOWAS hold no supranational powers over it's member states.
Decisions become binding only after ratification, usually by
at least seven signatory states. The drawback of the unanimity
rule is the slowness of the decision process and the fact that
each member is able to paralyse the process by using it's
veto. The time lag between problem identification and decision
taken may become so great that the situation may change to the
extent that the decision applied may no longer keep with the
actual circumstances.
Chapter Two
The Diverse West African Environment and Resource Base
For successful industrial development to occur in a country
or region, consideration must first be given to it's resource
base. It is commonly recognized that the pace and structure of
industrialization in a country will depend on such factors as
the endowment of human and natural resources, size, climate,
geographic location, and the international environment, all of
which affect access to markets, capital, and technology.
(Cody: 1980) Without adequate quantity and quality of
requisite resources, efforts at industrialization on an
appreciable scale are bound to be hampered, if not seriously
frustrated. This is the case where, particularly in West
Africa, modern manufacturing is as yet rudimentary and
progress is at a relatively low rate. (Onyemelukwe: 1984)
Sustained development also depends upon the existence of an
industrial infrastructure including transport facilities, an
acceptable monetary system, the availability of power
supplies, and system of education and training to enable the
inhabitants to fully participate in the development process.
In this chapter the industrial resource base of Africa, with
particular attention given to West Africa, will be examined.
Although there exists in Africa wide variations in resource
distributions in the individual countries, the region as a
whole enjoys a generous endowment of natural wealth. It's
resources, both above and below ground, are quite impressive,
if not haphazardly distributed between nations. Africa
occupies about one-quarter of the earth's land surface, and is
the second largest continent in the world. The continent
contains over 30 million square kilometers, of which the
Sahara desert occupies one-third. The Northern slice of Africa
consists almost entirely of huge states, a vast area filled by
nine states of over one million square kilometers each, and
two of which exceed two million kilometers. Niger and Mali are
by far the largest West African states by area, both being
well over 1,200 square kilometers. By contrast, there are
thirteen countries in Sub-Saharan Africa which have an area of
less than 50 thousand square kilometers. Cape Verde, the
Gambia, and Guinea-Bissau are the smallest states in the West
African sub-region. The shape of the continent is such that
much of the interior is remote from the sea, and many (14) of
its countries are landlocked. (Bailey: 1977) Mali, Niger, and
Burkina Faso are the landlocked states of West Africa. The
other twelve are coastline states, with Cape Verde being the
only island. Together the sixteen nation of West Africa occupy
nearly 6.5 million square kilometers, an area larger than
Europe excluding the USSR.
Climate
Among its fifty independent states there is a variety of
climatic zones which span the whole spectrum from temperate,
well-watered highlands to arid deserts, and from dry savannah
to tropical rainforests. West Africa too, covers a wide range
of tropical climate, from the equatorial forest climate type
to the hot desert type. The forests have relatively heavy
rainfall and long growing seasons, as opposed to the drier
savannas which have a shorter growing season. The northernmost
Sahelian belt, composed of much of Mauritania and northern
Senegal, Mali, and Niger have a short (less than 3 months) wet
season where crops usually cannot be grown without irrigation.
In the Sudanic belt further south, the rainy season may extend
up to five months. In the sub-Sudanic belt the rainy season is
still longer (up to seven months) but the region has been less
attractive to human settlement, partly because of the
widespread occurrence of tsetse flies which make cattle
raising difficult or impossible. (Rimmer: 1984)
These climatic differences help explain variations in
economic opportunities, material levels of living, and
population densities within the West Africa subregion. Food
and products for overseas markets are more easily cropped in
the forests and populations are pulled towards the coast due
to it's cropping advantages. On the other hand, the
intermediate lands between the Sudanic and Guinean zones are
sparsely populated and residence for pastoralists of the Sahel
and some of the poorest people in the world.
Agriculture
The agricultural potential of Africa also varies widely
between both countries and regions. Central, West, and
Southern Africa contain large cultivable areas and relatively
low population densities. In contrast, most of the Sahel,
parts of mountainous East Africa, and the dry belt stretching
from the coast of Angola through Botswana, Lesotho and
southern Mozambique all support large populations and hence
need food imports. (World Bank: 1989) Nonetheless, Africa is
responsible for a substantial share of total world production
of agricultural raw materials, especially in vegetable oils,
cocoa beans, citrus fruits, timber, rubber, groundnuts, and
sisal. Agricultural production in Africa occupies
approximately two-thirds of the entire labor force, provides
33 percent of Africa's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 40
percent of its exports.
Virtually every country in West Africa has extensive tracts
of land capable of sustaining some form of agricultural
activity. The main vegetation belts in West Africa are shown
on map 1. The production of cocoa, coffee, and oil palm are
confined to the forest zones of the Atlantic coast countries.
The main producers of cocoa in the region are Ghana, Cote
d'Ivoire, and Nigeria. The producers of coffee of note are
Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Togo, and Liberia. West
African economies with a sizeable oil palm economy are
Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. Rubber and
timber also thrive in the tropical rainforests where rainfall
is abundant. Nigeria, Liberia, Ghana, and Sierra Leone are the
primary producers of both.
Map 1: The main vegitation belts of West Africa
Source: J.O.C. Onyemelukwe. Industrialization in West
Africa . London: St. Martin's Press. (1984), 25
The rich sandy soils on which the groundnut crop grows , -y
well are common features of the drier savanna regions,
especially the Sudan savanna. Senegal is the chief producer in
the region, and a sizeable portion of the Gambia's economy is
based on groundnut production. Nigeria was formerly the
world's chief exporter of groundnuts, though production
dropped sharply by the early 1980s due to the concentration on
oil production.
Cotton seed production is more geographically widespread in
the subregion than any other product, though overall output is
low, particularly for export. Mali and Cote d'Ivoire are the
largest producers of cotton in the sub-region. Many of the
Sahelian countries such as Niger, Mali, and Mauritania, rely
on livestock for a great deal of their Gross Domestic Product
accounted for by agriculture. The fisheries industry,
previously unexploited on a large scale, is beginning to grow
in importance for many of the coastal nations. The fishing
industry is a large foreign exchange earner for Cape Verde and
Mauritania, which border one of the richest fishing grounds in
the world.
Minerals
The area in which Africa's contribution to the world economy
may be most significant is in the production of precious metal
and mineral resources. Geologically, Africa's mineral
potential is at least equal to, if not greater than that of
other continents. Africa's mining output is vital to the
world's nuclear, aerospace, steel, and abrasives industrie
West Africa in particular is endowed with a variety of
minerals. As a result, mining and extraction has been a major
economic activity in most West African countries and
contributes substantially to their individual Gross Domestic
Product.
Most of the world's cobalt, a strategic mineral
indispensable for the production of high strength, high
temperature alloys essential to the aircraft and space
industry and the production of permanent magnets, are produced
by Zaire and Zambia, the world's largest and second largest
producer, respectively. Together they produce 74 percent of
the world total. (World Bank: p.123) About 15-20 percent of
the world's copper is also produced in Zambia and Zaire, the
latter of which has current reserves which are sufficient to
last for 40 years, as well as the world richest undeveloped
copper deposits at Tenke and Fungerume. African bauxite, an
important mineral from which aluminum is derived, remains in
high demand on world markets on account of its high ore grade.
At present West Africa dominates production, with Guinea
accounting for 90 percent of regional production, which in
turn amounts to 25 percent of world supply. Sierra Leone is
the second largest regional producer with a share of 7.6
percent and Ghana comes third. (Survey: 1988).
Uranium for the first atomic bombs came from Katanga in
Zaire before the days of independence. Gabon has also been a
main source of uranium for French atomic activity, and other
deposits exist in the Southern African Republic and Niger.
(Bailey: p.17) Niger is fortunate in possessing a number of
valuable mineral resources. Besides uranium it has proven
deposits of phosphate, iron, petroleum, gold, copper and
gypsum. Manganese reserves in West Africa have so far been
found in Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, and Burkina Faso, although the
size of the deposits are yet to be determined. The manganese
reserves can be considered a stable source of alloys for a
future West African steel industry. The mining and working of
iron ore are ancient in West Africa, but strong competition
mainly from Brazil, Australia, and some minor producers, has
created a harsh economic environment for iron ore mining
operations in Mauritania and Liberia. The recent fall in iron
ore prices has prompted sponsors of projects in Cote d'Ivoire,
Gabon, Senegal, and Sierra Leone to wait for conditions to
improve. (Survey: p.55)
Energy
Fissionable energy sources are also quite impressive and
promise to be more significant in the future. But while some
countries have considerable non-mineral and oil wealth, others
have virtually none. Natural energy sources are abundant in
Sub-Saharan Africa, and an annual energy growth rate of five
percent would consume only a fraction of the known oil, gas,
coa-1, hydro, and geothermal resources. For example, known
petroleum reserves are equivalent to 120 years of supplies in
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the region at current rate of consumption. (World Bank: p.128)
West African petroleum potential is immense and could form a
strong base for large scale production of fuel oils,
lubricants, petro-chemical and a host of other possible
derivatives. (Onyemelukwe: p.46) Besides Nigeria, which is one
of the world's top ten producers of an especially high-grade
crude oil, Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, and Benin have reserves
whose sizes are yet to be estimated. Gas has also been found
in Nigeria, mainly in the same areas as petroleum. Exploitable
coal reserves in Africa amount to 135 billion tons, although
the West African sub-region has very limited reserves. Africa
has about the highest hydro-electric potential in the world,
but less than four percent of its hydro-energy potential has
been developed. (World Bank: p.11)
Considering the tremendous endowment in agricultural,
mineral, and energy resources, the West African resource
endowment can possibly become a stable base for
industrialization and foreign exchange earnings. It should be
noted, however, that development of mineral resources require
massive infusions of capital, which most African countries
cannot afford at the present time. Also, the inherent
volatility of world mineral markets subject to recurring
periods of booms and slumps have had a severely disruptive
effects on economies dependent on minerals due to price
fluctuations.
32
Human Resources
It is commonly supposed that the larger the population, the
larger the manpower available to a state for economic and
military mobilization. In this regard, population is equated
with manpower, which is then equated with political power
conceived in terms of economic and political power. However, a
large population is not always an advantage. For it can be
argued that the quality is more important than the absolute
size of the population. A state with a large but poor quality
manpower through being ill-fed, diseased, and uneducated, is
always at a disadvantage compared to a state with a small but
high-quality and therefore more efficient population.
Furthermore, the larger the population the heavier the demands
for food supply and other raw materials. (Ojo: 1985)
The estimated mid-1987 population of developing Africa was
553 million, compared to 447 million in 1980. Thus, between
1980 and 1987, the population increased by 3.1 percent per
annum, one of the highest population growth rates in the world
and one which is attributable mainly to high fertility and
falling mortality rates rather than migration. (Survey: p.79)
During the past three decades population growth has steadily
risen, and is now outpacing the average GNP growth rate of the
region. Sub-Saharan Africa alone currently supports 450
million people, twice the population at independence, and if
current trends continue it will have 500 million inhabitants
by 1990 and one billion by 2010. (World Bank: p.6)
Africa accounts for 11.1 percent of the world population
and 14.5 percent of the developing areas. The most populous
sub-regions are West Africa, East and Southern Africa, each
with roughly 180 million people. (See table 2.1 for West
African Demographic Indicators) Again, there are wide
variations between nations. Of the 50 countries of developing
Africa, 23 have populations of less than five million each,
and of these 10 have populations of less than one million. At
one extreme is Nigeria, which is not one of the twelve largest
African nations by area, but more than doubles the population
of any other state with over 106.6 million people. The three
next largest are Egypt, Ethiopia, and Zaire with population
(in millions) of 49, 45, and 32 respectively. By contrast,
Cape Verde with 300,000, the Gambia with 800,000, and Guinea-
Bissau with 900,000 inhabitants constitute the smallest
populations in West Africa. Population densities also provide
extreme contrasts, with more than 246 persons per square
kilometer around Lake Victoria to less than one per square
kilometer in Mauritania.
The alarming rate of population growth will have severe
negative consequences on development objectives as population
size and growth are important determinants of the general pace
of economic and social progress. Increased demand for food
production reduces the share of resources devoted to other
social sectors such as health and education. Africa will also
find it increasingly difficult to find jobs for new entrants
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TABLE 2.1
DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS
POP. (a) LIFE (b) CRUDE BIRTH CRUDE DEATH
GROWTH RATE EXPECTANCE RATE PER RATE PER
1988 AT BIRTH THSNO POP. THSND POP.
(x) 1987 (YRS) 1982 1986 1982 1986
BENIN 3.0 50 50.7 50.5 21.2 19.8
BURKINA FASO 2.8 47 47.8 47.7 20.1 18.9
CAPE VERDE 2.5 65 30.9 32.9 11.4 10.2
COTE O'IVOIRE 3.6 52 45.6 45.3 15.6 14.6
GAMBIA 2.5 43 48.4 48.2 29.0 27.3
GHANA 3.1 54 46.9 46.9 14.6 13.6
GUINEA 2.4 42 46.8 46.6 23.5 22.2
GUINEA-BISSAU 1.9 39 40.7 40.8 21.7 20.3
LIBERIA 3.2 54 48.7 48.2 17.2 15.9
MALI 2.9 47 50.6 50.2 22.5 21.1
MAURITANIA 2.7 46 50.1 50.0 20.9 19.5
NIGER 2.9 45 51.0 50.9 22.9 21.3
NIGERIA 2.9 51 50.4 50.5 17.1 16.0. 
SENEGAL 2.6 48 46.4 46.4 20.9 19.7 m
SIERRA LEONE 2.4 41 47.4 47.0 29.7 28.0
TOGO 3.4 59 45.2 45.0 15.7 14.3
SOURCES: Survey of Economic and Social Conditions in Africa, 1986-1987.
New York: United Nations, 1988.
(a) African Farmer. New York: the Hunger Project, No.2, December 1989.
(b) SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth.
Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1989.
in the labor force, which will lead to an increase in
unemployment and underemployment, and the absorption of many
in the informal sectors which are now characterized by low
productivity. West Africa, in general, have also been
experiencing many problems related to manpower development.
Skilled labor needed for such specialized functions as
industrial operations and business management are in very
short supply. The West African sub-region is plagued by low
literacy rates. (See table 2.2) Also, the low technical
content of the type of education inherited from the former
colonial powers is still one of the common features of
education in West African countries. This, coupled with
inadequate facilities, has ensured a slow development of
manpower appropriate for industrial development. (Onyemelukwe:
p.51)
The list of resources which Africa, particularly West
Africa, can deploy to further development is impressive in
total, but less so when examined country by country. However,
despite abundant resources on an aggregate scale, both
material and human, and great potential for others, the
incontestable fact remains that the continent remains to be
one of the poorest and most underdeveloped regions of the
world. The Sub-Saharan region had a total GDP of about $135
billion in 1987, about the same Belgium which has only 10
million inhabitants. The average per capita Gross National
Product (GNP) for the continent as a whole was $561 in 1987.
TABLE 2.2
LITERACY RATES (%)
BOTH SEXES
1982
BENIN
BURKINA FASO
CAPE VERDE
COTE D'IVOIRE
GAMBIA
GHANA
GUINEA
GUINEA-BISSAU
LIBERIA
MALI
MAURITANIA
NIGER
NIGERIA
SENEGAL
SIERRA LEONE
TOGO
1984 1986
27
13
47
41
23
51
27
29
34
16
27
13
39
26
27
38
45
27
55
29
3 4
36
18
29
16
45
30
31
45
-SOURCES: Survey of Economic and Social Conditions in Africa,
1986-1987.
New York: United Nations, 1988.
Sub-Saharan states had an average per capita GNP of $330 per
annum in the same year. The West African subregion is one of
the least economically developed regions of the world, with an
average per capita GNP slightly lower than the Sub-Saharan
average.
Economic growth has unevenly spread over time and across
countries in the region as a whole, West Africa included.
There were three broadly distinct identifiable periods in the
post independence era: 1965-1972, when incomes per capita grew
in general; 1973-1980, a period of stagnation; and 1981-1987
characterized by years of decline and negative growth rates.
(See table 2.3) Average economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa
has averaged 3.4 percent a year since 1961, which is only a
fraction above population growth. Economic performance was
particularly atrocious since the beginning of the present
decade with an average annual growth rate of GDP of only 0.4
percent for the region as a whole for the period 1980-1987.
Per capita income has also steadily declined by about 2.6
percent per annum within the same time frame. Such a sharp
decline in the standard of living of the African population
has severely and adversely affected the most vulnerable groups
of society; namely women, youth, the disabled and the aged.
(UNECA: 1989)
Compounding the effects of slow growth on development is a
mounting external debt, which stood at 218.1 billion in
December 1987, amounting to almost three times annual exports
TABLE 2.3
BASIC INDICATORS
GNP PER CAPITA
POP. AREA DOLLARS AVG. ANNUAL GOP
MILLIONS (sq. kim.) 1987 GROWTH RATE (in millions)
MID-'87 1965-73 1973-80 1980-87 1965 1980 1987
BENIN 4.3 112622 310 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 220 1041 1570
BURKINA FASO 8.3 274200 190 1.2 2.5 2.5 260 1199 1650
CAPE VEPE 0.3 4033 500 .. 7.3 1.2 .. 89 158
COTE O'IV.OIRE 11.1 322463 740 4.5 1.2 -3.0 760 8482 7650
GAMBIA 0.8 11295 220 1.7 0.2 0.8 37 205 172
GHANA 13.6 238537 390 1.0 -2.1 -2.0 2050 4445 5080
GUINEA 6.5 245857 .. 1.2 1.3 -0.1 520 1764 2166
GUINEA-RISSAU 0.9 36125 160 .. -4.2 0.8 .. 105 135
LIBERIA 2.3 111369 450 2.4 -0.7 -5.2 270 1001 990
MALI 7.8 1240000 210 .. 4.3 0.7 260 1629 1960
MAURITANIA 1.9 1030700 440 1.2 -0.6 -1.6 160 666 840
NIGER 6.8 1267000 260 -3.7 2.6 -4.9 670 2538 2160
NIGERIA 106.6 923768 370 5.3 1.2 -4.8 5850 100147 24390
SENEGAL 7.0 196192 520 -0.8 -0.5 0.1 810 2970 4720
SIERRA LEONE 3.8 71740 300 2.3 -0.8 -2.0 320 1013 900
TOGO 3.2 56785 290 2.0 1.5 -3.9 190 1136 1230
SOURCES: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth. Washingto D.C.: The World Bank, 1989.
Survey of Economic and Social Conditions in Africa, 1986-1987. New York: United Nations, 1988.
and representing 70 percent of regional GDP. (Survey: p.15)
But it is not the absolute amount of the debt which is the
major cause for concern. Africa is the least indebted of all
the developing regions. It is the escalation of debt in
relation to the ability to manage it which poses the real
problem. Debt service obligations rose in the region to a
point where they could not be met without sacrificing growth
or neglecting national development goals.
Productive Sector Performance:
Agriculture
During the 1960s agricultural production grew at 2.7 percent
a year, but thereafter growth slowed considerably averaging
only 1.4 percent from 1970 to 1985--approximately half the
population growth rate. (World Bank: p.18) According to data
provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO), the output of agriculture (including
fishing and forestry), the primary sector in developing
Africa, increased by a mere 0.5 percent in 1987, compared to
3.8 percent in 1986. (Survey: p.39) During the past 30 years
agricultural production in Sub-Saharan Africa has risen by an
average of only 2 percent a year, while total volume of
agricultural exports has declined. A more significant and
disturbing fact is that there is hardly any African country
which produces enough food to feed its population, thus most
spend a considerable amount of foreign exchange to import
food. For example, Nigeria, a relatively wealthy country and
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heavily endowed with agricultural resources has in recent
years spent over $1.5 billion on food imports. (Ojo: p.53)
Cape Verde, Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and
Ghana are the other West African nations which required food
imports within the last decade. Severe food shortages and
famine has been a common feature during the 1980s in Sub-
Saharan Africa.
There are varied reasons why agricultural growth has slowed
in the last two decades and have been unable to keep up with
population growth. Principle causes have been drought
(particularly in the Sahel region during 1972-74, and again in
the mid-1980s in the same region and large portions of eastern
and southern Africa), and a bias of incentives against
agricultural production. The agricultural production base in
Africa is typically narrow, both in terms of size, and in
relation to the range of goods produced. The structure of Sub-
Saharan exports have remained largely unchanged since the
early 1960s; the heavy reliance on primary commodities
(including oil) persists. Primary commodities accounted for 93
percent of total export earnings in 1970, declining slightly
to 88 percent by the mid 1980s. (World Bank: p.20) The limited
access to markets in the industrialized countries whose demand
for raw materials has dropped noticeably as a consequence of
their own economic problems and the increasing replacement of
raw material inputs by synthetics, has depressed raw materials
prices on the world market resulting in deteriorating terms of
trade for primary produce. The dependence on a restricted
number of agricultural products renders it impossible to
articulate and implement a genuine development programme.
Industry
During the two decades 1960-1980, developing countries made
rapid industrial progress. The Third World's share of
industrial production increased by nearly 50 percent over the
20 year period; from a under 7 percent in 1960 to over 10
percent in 1980. The share of industry in national production
also increased considerably, from an average 13 percent in
1960 to 20 percent in 1980. (Singh: 1984) These achievements
however are being seriously jeopardized by the world economic
downturn of recent years. There was virtually no increases of
per capita GDP in Third World countries in 1981 and 1982, and
UNIDO statistics indicate that the average rate of
manufacturing production has steadily decreased; from 8
percent in 1963-73 to 5.8 percent between 1973 and 1980.
There have been a similar retrogression of growth trends in
Africa as well. Although industry grew roughly three times as
fast as agriculture in the first decade of independence, the
past few years have seen an alarming reversal in many African
countries where deindustrialization have set in. Manufacturing
evidently was a leading sector in the 1960s in West Africa,
with an average annual growth rate substantially higher than
the growth rate of GDP in the region. (See table 2.4) During
the period 1970-75, the rate of industrial growth in Africa--
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TABLE 2.4
GROWTH OF PRODUCTION: BY SECTOR
AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE
GOP
1965-73 1973-80
AGRICULTURE
1980-87 1965-73 1973-80 1980-87 1965-73
INDUSTRY
1973-80 1980-87 1965-73
NUFACTURING (a)
1973-80 1980-87
BENIN 1.9
BURKINA FASO .
CAPE VERDE (b) .
COTE D'IVOIRE 8.6
GAMBIA 4.4
GHANA (b) 3.14
GUINEA (b) 3.2
GUINER-BISSRU (b) .
LIBERIA 5.4
MALI 2.7
MAURITANIA 2.6
NIGER -1.2
NIGERIA 8.4
SENEGAL (b) 1.6
SIERRA LEONE 3.5
TOGO (b) 5.5
2.3
3.9
4.1
4.?
2.0
-0.3
4.1
1.2
2.0
6.3
2.6
5.6
3.4
2.3
1.8
4.1
2.8
5.6
6.6
2.1
5.0
1.1
2.1
3.7
-1.3
3.4
1.4
-1.9
-1.7
3.3
0.?
-0.5
.. 3.4
.. 1.3
1.9
4.5
4.5
6.5
0.9
-2.1
-2.9
2.9
0.2
1.5
2.6
3.3
0.9
0.0
2.5
-3.4
1.0
7.1
-0.3
1.4
-1.1
0.4
3.9
1.9
2.5
6.1
1.6
7.1
0.0
5.7
1.2
0.3
1.5
2.8
0.6
1.2
1.6
0.9
.. 0.?
.. 1.5
12.5
3.8
4.3
6.2
1.1
4.3
13.2
19.6
3.5
1.9
6.2
11.7?
-2.1
-3.4
9.1
3.6
-1.5
1.6
1.2
14.3
5.7
6.2
-4.6
6.7
8.3
3.9
-2.4
5.8
0.1
3.6
-6.0
9.8
5.1
-4.3
-1.4
4.3
-2.3
-1.6
-2.6
10.9
6.5
13.2
15.0
4.0
3.3
8.3
-2.8
-1.1
1.4
17.2
1.5
3.9
8.2
1.3
-5.0
-2.1
4.3
0.6
SERVICES
1965-73 1973-90 1980-97
BENIN
BURKINA FASO
CAPE VERDE (b)
COTE D'IVOIRE
GAMBIA
GHANA (b)
GUINEA (b)
GUINEA-9ISSAU (b)
LIBERIA
MALI
MAURI TANI A
NIGER
NIGERIA
SENEGAL (b)
SIERRA LEONE
TOGO (b)
1.5
.. 9.5
11.2
1.6
1.1
3.8
8.5
8.1
-1.6
6.6
1.5
7.1
7.3
3.6
4.0
0.6
3.4
11.9
3.3
6.4
6.2
7.8
5.4
1.6
4.2
4.2
1.3
5.8
4.2
3.?
4.2
1.0
-0.8
5.9
-1.3
-8.0
-0.3
2.4
1.3
-0.7
NOTE: (a) Because manufacturing is generally the most dynaric part of the industrial sector, it's growth rate is shown separately.
(b) GDP and it's conponents are at purchaser values
SOURCE: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth. Washingto D.C.: The World Bank, 1989.
about 5 percent per annum--allowed the continent to maintain
it's share of in world industrial production, mainly because
of the industrial slowdown in the West. (Europa: 1990)
However, starting from the relatively high rate of 9.3
percent per annum during 1960-65, the growth of real
manufacturing output in non-arid low income countries
continually fell in each five year period, becoming negative
over 1975-80. During the period 1980-1986, for Africa as a
whole, the manufacturing sector had recorded an average annual
growth rate of 3.1 percent at 1980 prices. (Survey: p.57) In
1986 the manufacturing sub-sector contributed less than 6
percent of GDP in seven West African countries, while at the
other extreme, it's contribution in four countries was more
than 10 percent. (See table 2.5)
Furthermore, the performance of the region remains inferior
to that of other developing regions. While GDP and
manufacturing value added (MVA) grew in 1986 by 3.6 percent
and 6.7 percent, respectively, in Latin America, and by 5.9
percent and 10 percent respectively in Asia and the Pacific
region, GDP grew by only 0.5 percent and MVA by 2.4 percent in
Africa. (Survey: p.57) Africa's share in world exports of
manufactures fell from 1.12 percent during 1970-1971 to 0.6
percent in 1975-76, and it has been estimated that at the very
best Africa might contribute 2 percent of the world
manufacturing output by the year 2000. The meager
manufacturing is so far heavily concentrated in the area of
AGRICULTURE
BENIN
BURKINA FASO
CAPE VERDE
COTE D'IVOIRE
GAMBIA
GHANA
GUINEA
GUINEA-BISSAU
LIBERIA
MALI
MAURITANIA
NIGER
NIGERIA
SENEGAL
SIERRA LEONE
TOGO
46.65
47.23
20.64
43.06
27.58
45.12
60.93
51.45
21.39
55.29
29.48
49.86
28.82
21.51
48.71
34.70
TABLE 2.5
STRUCTURE OF GOP BY MAIN SECTORS (W)
(AT CURRENT FRCTOR COST)
1986
SERVICES INOUSTRY MRNUFACTU
(TOTAL)
38.19 15.16 6.41
35.74 17.03 14.38
50.38 28.99 5.29
38.17 18.76 11.03
57.04 15.38 6.70
36.82 18.07 12.24
23.91 15.16 2.96
43.10 5.45 1.45
53.08 25.54 8.47
29.52 15.18 7.88
46.85 23.66 5.35
33.39 16.75 3.91
38.87 32.31 5.15
48.92 29.58 19.04
38.01 13.28 3.49
39.18 26.12 7.66
SOURCE: Survey of Economic and Social Conditions in Africa, 1986-1987.
New York: United Nations, 1988.
light industry, especially in the food/beverage and
textile/clothing sectors.
Among all the country groups, the industrial plight of
Africa, including West Africa, is the most difficult. Many of
these economies are in a "fundamental structural
disequilibrium" in the sense that their productive systems are
unable to generate sufficient exports to pay for required
imports even at a rate of economic growth which will keep
their per capita incomes constant. (Singh: p.164) African
industry is now characterized by small domestic markets,
inadequate technical skills, inefficient management, and
unsuitability of equipment. Industrial production, employment,
and capacity utilization has plummeted. As a result, scarce
resources for fledgling industrial sectors has shifted back to
export crops in order to increase export earnings as the
massive deindustrialization continues.
The reasons for the decline in both agricultural
productivity and industrial growth can be partially attributed
to the slowdown in world economic activity since 1979,
including the decline in volume of world trade, the
deterioration in terms of trade, the rise in interest rates,
and volatile exchange rates engendered by the recession which
have particularly affected Africa. A second factor can be
attributed to the post-independence industrial development
str.ategy of import substitution.
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The Failure of Import Substitution In Developing Countries
Initial processing of agricultural raw materials for export
was the main focus of industrialization during the colonial
period. Economic development began with the export of semi-
processed raw materials, foodstuffs and minerals, with only a
limited range of commodities entering international trade. At
this stage the main concern was to organize production and
provide the means of transporting the products to ports
equipped to handle them efficiently. (Bailey: p.29). However,
after independence African leaders turned their attention to
the low levels of industrialization in their various countries
and began to emphasize strategies which could expand their
industrial base.
There are various types of industrialization strategies
pursued in the developing areas, including export processing,
basic industries development, and more recently, the basic
needs approach. However, industrialization in the least
developed countries is generally characterized by import
substitution, that is, development of the domestic production
of manufactured goods previously imported. Import substitution
was the most common approach to industrialization in West
Africa during the 1960s. Economic development based on import
substitution implies that development takes place in the short
run under conditions not of comparative advantages, but of
disadvantages. (Cukor: 1974) Primarily it is not the
production of raw materials for exports which are developed,
but industrial products for domestic use which were formerly
imported from abroad. Under the present circumstances, it is
in the production of raw materials (mainly certain mineral and
agricultural products), that African countries have
comparative advantages, and the production of manufactures
products is comparatively disadvantageous. Import substitution
was attractive to African leaders because it met a demand that
was already known and can be measured by existing imports. It
offered the possibility of beginning with the easiest, final
stage processes until more experience is gained with modern
technologies.
Although exceptions can be found, policy-makers generally
conceded that the import substitution process must begin with
the production of consumer goods. Local production of consumer
goods provided visible evidence of self-reliance and can save
foreign exchange if it involves substantial contributions from
domestic inputs. In the long term though, economists thought
of import substitution as a sequential process working its way
from light consumer goods to heavy industrial and capital
goods. In other words, the growth process was to be spurred
first by consumer goods industries, followed by an expansion
of the production supplies and intermediates, and later
capital goods. (Ballance: 1982) This sequence implied the
existence of a systematic body of measures to encourage the
development of different types of industries in different
phases of development process. The relative level of promotion
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to each category should have changed accordingly, favoring
first one set of industries and then another. With few
exceptions, this pattern of tariff setting failed to
materialize.
When the developing countries began to consider strategies
for industrialization, the USSR had demonstrated that
centralized command planning could force a high rate of
industrialization in a large underdeveloped country. The rapid
growth of heavy industry in centrally planned economies
underlined this perception after World War Two. An important
role for government came to be acknowledged in market
economies also. The depression of the 1930s and the subsequent
Keynesian revolution in economic thought indicated that a
market economy could not be self-equilibriating. (Cody: p.4)
It was thus generally accepted by the time African
independence came about, that government would have to play a
central role in industrialization as part of their overall
responsibility for making economic growth and development as
rapid as possible. Strong public sector role in industry was
often justified to supplant dependence on foreign capital and
take risks that foreign investors would not.
It was believed that import substitution required, at least
in the industrially backward countries, drastic interference
with the accustomed economic processes and a readiness to make
certain sacrifices in the short run in the interests of
advantages in the long run. Help must be secured in some form
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of state support given to overcome the comparative
disadvantages. These public sector intervention policies took
a variety of forms. They assumed the form of protective
customs duties, protection through trade and industrial
licencing policies, tax reductions, state investments or
credits through development finance corporations, restriction
of competitive imports by managing foreign exchange or
imports, favorable interest rates, or some combination of
these measures. (Cukor: p.95) A direct allocation of a portion
of the government capital budget was used almost universally,
at least for key industries and those considered too large or
strategic for private investment.
In practice, once the LDC's imposed tariffs, their levels
were not later reduced. The protection of consumer goods
eventually became a permanent feature of industrial policy.
Tariffs were raised to reduce import demand, with the highest
rates put on luxury consumer items while those on capital and
intermediate goods were kept low or nil to encourage
industrial investment. This approach ran counter to the
original concept of a sequential process moving from consumer
goods to intermediates and then capital goods.
In retrospect, tariff setting altered the pattern of
economic activity and the domestic resource allocation. The
result was very high rates of effective protection, especially
to final-stage, assembly-type operations using imported
inputs. It prompted a movement of resources out of agriculture
and mining and into the import-competing manufactures.
(Ballance: p.42) Most of those LDC's that vigorously pursued
an import substitution strategy had a large agricultural
sector which was the main loser. Import-intensive operations
were also favored by the tendency to keep exchange rates fixed
rather than allow them to fluctuate as currencies weakened:
the resulting overvaluation of exchange rates acted as a
disincentive to production of exports and to agriculture in
general. (WB Tech. Paper #25: p.24) This affected the pace of
industrialization through rising food imports, which compete
against industrial inputs for scarce foreign exchange.
This process and its underlying economic policy has been
criticized in recent years, and has generally perceived to be
a failure. Aside from the neglect of the agricultural sector,
the production of manufactures for export was also
considerably discouraged. Import substitution industries often
tended to produce goods of lower quality than those previously
imported and at higher prices. As the import substitution
pattern came into effect, it did so in response to market
forces. It thus tended to encourage the production of consumer
goods for those with higher incomes. Furthermore, the process
focused on producing for those consumers who previously could
afford to buy imported goods--including luxuries, which
diverted resources away from more profitable uses. Since many
of the import substituting industries were initially largely
assembly processes, it created a certain degree of reliance on
imported raw material and components which had to be purchased
from the industrialized countries. The demand for this type of
good could only be met partially by local firms expanding and
diversifying their production. As they did so however, they
found it necessary to continually import more advanced
technology; so instead of importing consumer goods, the LDC's
were importing machinery to make them, which usually created a
sharp rise in foreign exchange requirements. (Kemp: p.141) The
LDC's were importing relatively complex technologies, but
without the sustained experimentation in technological
development and innovation that had been associated with the
original emergence of these industries. The general bias of
protective structures in favor of consumer goods, together
with exemptions from tariffs on capital and intermediate
goods, tended to generally discourage both the use of and
investment in local inputs.
Industrial growth was eventually slowed as the limits of
import substitution for consumer goods had been reached and
intermediate and capital goods industries failed to emerge.
Substitution policies tended to work against the objective of
self-reliant development through low-cost, labor intensive
production using local resources. Much of the industrial
capacity built in West Africa during the early post-
independence years utilized foreign sources of supply to
produce for upper-income domestic consumers. The import
substitution model had indeed paved the way for expansion and
capital accumulation, but instead of being the basis for
national independence it became a vehicle for the penetration
of foreign capital. As a result, the overall dependence of
West African countries on foreign imports for manufactured
goods did not necessarily decrease, but shifted from consumer
goods to inputs and capital goods. (See table 2.6)
The strategy failed in part because it was based on poorly
adapted foreign models. The vision was couched in the idiom of
modernization--meaning the transfer of Northern values,
institutions and technologies to the South. In recent years,
however, many elements of this vision has been changed and
alternative paths to industrialization have been proposed. One
such path is the development of industrial capacity through
regional integration, as in the case of ECOWAS. The formation
of West African economic union would provide a basis for
regional rather than solely national development, and
encourage the emergence of intermediate and capital goods
industries without the compelling reliance on extra-regional
sources for inputs.
TABLE 2.6
STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE IMPORTS
PERCENTAGE SHARES
OTHER
FOOD FUELS PRIMARY COMMODITIES
1965 1980 1987 1965 1980 1987 1965 1980 1987
BENIN 18 19 11 6 '4 34 7 8
BURKINA FASO 23 19 16 '4 13 3 14 '4 5
CAPE VERDE -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
COTE D'IVOIRE -18 17 19 6 17 15 3 3 14
GAMBIA 19 11 43 3 7 '4 7 3 14
GHANA 12 9 6 '4 27 17 3 4 3
GUINEA .. - -- -- - -- -- --
GUINEA-BISSAU - -- -- -- -- -- -
LIBERIA 16 18 19 8 28 21 3 3 3
MALI 20 16 12 6 17 16 5 2 2
MAURITANIA 9 29 26 .4 9 10 1 3 2
NIGER 12 13 18 6 26 6 6 '4 11
NIGERIA 9 17 8 6 2 3 3 3 3
SENEGAL 36 24 32 6 25 16 '4 2 2
SIERRA LEONE 17 19 17 9 114 9 3 5 '4
TOGO 15 19 20 3 20 6 5 3 6
MACHINERY AND OTHER
TRANSP. EQUIP. MANUFACTURES
1965 1980 1987 1965 1980 1987
BENIN 17 21 16 53 149 37
BURKINA FASO 19 29 3.4 40 34 '42
CAPE VERDE -- -- -- -- -- --
COTE D'IVOIRE 28 28 2e 46 35 35
GAMBIA 19 19 10 52 60 30
GHANA 33 30 36 48 31 37
GUINEA -- -- -- -- - - -
GUINEA-BISSAU -- -- -- --
LIBERIA 34 28 29 39 23 29
MALI 23 39 .4'4 '47 26 27
MAURITANIA 56 36 35 30 25 27
NIGER 21 27 31 55 29 20
NIGERIA 3-4 33 36 48 45 50
SENEGAL 15 23 16 38 25 33
SIERRA LEONE 30 18 20 '41 44 49
TOGO 31 20 28 -45 38 40
1989.
SOURCE: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth. Washingto D.C.: The World Bank,
Chapter Three
Industrial Progress in West Africa
The level of industrial development in a country is closely
related to the structure of it's manufacturing industry.
Furthermore, an efficient strategy for acceleration of
industrialization in the future must be dependent on a careful
evaluation of the current structure of manufacturing
production. (Diejomaoh: p.44) The purpose of this chapter is
to evaluate the structure and component of the manufacturing
industries of the ECOWAS member-states, in order to identify
certain trends and commonalities among them. Keeping these
trends in mind, a region-wide ECOWAS industrial strategy may
be formulated to address the identified problem areas.
Despite the general consensus on the overall failure of
these development strategies, the practice of primary export
promotion and import substitution continues to be embraced by
many of the countries in West Africa. To a large extent the
nations of West Africa are still geared to supply raw
materials to the industrialized countries from which they
receive manufactured goods. Beyond this, many industries
undertake further processing of agricultural products and
minerals before export because effective primary export
promotion often involves some form of commodity valorization--
the process of enhancing product quality per unit of weight
through processing. If by their low value per unit of weight
or volume agricultural and mineral raw materials cannot
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profitably bear the cost of long distance transportation,
first stage processing of agricultural products and
beneficiation of minerals become very necessary in the
exporting country. (Onyemelukwe: p.59) Although there are
manufacturing enterprises engaged in finishing functions among
the most industrial progressive nations, generally speaking,
there is very little export promotion outside the initial
stage processing sub-sector achieved by West African states.
Certain import substitution industries are to be found in most
West African countries, particularly in food processing,
building materials, and simple consumer goods.
The sixteen countries of the sub-region can be classified
into two groups: the comparatively more industrialized
countries which include Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, and
to a lesser extent, Togo and Ghana. By coincidence all the
countries mentioned in this first group are coastline states
with easier accessibility to the outside world, possess a
sizeable population, and have either abundant mineral deposits
or luxuriant vegetation. The remaining eleven nations of West
Africa who fall into the second classification are those which
are comparatively less industrialized, and are consequently
either still mainly preoccupied with the perfection and
expansion of their import substitution programmes, or have yet
to make a modest beginning at the import substitution stage.
The rest of this chapter will give a brief overview of the
current industrial capacity and structure of manufacturing in
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the nations of ECOWAS, broken down into the aforementioned
groupings.
The Less Industrially Advanced
With virtually nothing to export other than fish, Cape Verde
is a nation which has to import almost all it's food, fuels,
manufactured goods, and other essentials. The government pins
their hopes on expansion of fisheries, the shipping industry
and tourism for future development needs. The country's main
industries are fish canning, textiles, shoe making, rum
distilling, and soft drinks bottling, and the manufacturing
sector contributes roughly 5 percent to GDP. Guinea-Bissau is
a one of the 15 poorest countries in the world, with virtually
no industry outside of the agro-processing, brewing, and
cotton processing industries. Agriculture is the principle
economic activity, and the agricultural sector engaged about
80 percent of the population in 1986. Guinea-Bissau's main
exports are cotton, groundnuts, and palm kernels, but the
volume of export trade in these products are very low compared
to other nations in the region. The government hopes to
develop the mining sector, and prospecting, for bauxite,
petroleum and phosphates are being carried out.
Benin remains overwhelmingly a nation whose principle base
is organized around the processing and export of agricultural
products. Agriculture provides the livelihood for 70 percent
of-the population. The main food crops are yams, cassava, and
maize. The main export crops are cotton, palm products,
groundnuts, cocoa, and coffee. Thus, the industrial base
remains small and tied to the processing of agricultural
products, such as palm oil and a textile factory. The country
also produces construction material, has two cement works
factories and a brewery which started production in 1981.
Petroleum production by two Norwegian companies from an
offshore deposit began in Benin in 1983, but since then
development and exploration have been fraught with problems.
After a dispute with the first oil company, Saga of Norway,
the Benin government reached an agreement in 1985 with Swiss-
based Panco, providing for a tripling of production to 25,000
barrels per day and an investment programme of $2 billion,
including a refinery. (ACR:1986/87) However, this contract was
also eventually terminated, and now the oilfield is being
worked by local technicians contracted by a foreign staff.
Production of crude reached 6,000 barrels per day in 1988, but
Benin must continue to import oil for domestic consumption for
it has no refining capability. Apart from this ill-fated
petrol project, Benin has no known mineral resources. Overall
the secondary sector comprises mainly food, drinks,
manufacturing of building material, traditional agro-industry,
and import substitution industries. The government bases its
hopes on the private sector providing the main thrust of
industrial development. (ACR:1986/87,p.B8)
A review of many of the other countries in West Africa show
similar trends. Agriculture or mineral extraction for export
provides the bulk of foreign exchange, and certain initial-
stage processing and import substitution industries occupy a
small and inefficient industrial sector. For example, the
agricultural sector provides employment for nearly 90 percent
of the population in Burkina Faso. The country has few export
earners other than cotton, which is facing declining world
prices, and livestock, which come up against tariff barriers
from the European Economic Community. Smaller amounts of sugar
and groundnuts are also exported. The industrial sector is
dominated by agricultural processing, including a numerous
textiles factories and a mill, a cotton ginnery, and plant
producing refined sugar. Known mineral resources seem
considerable and it is hoped they will eventually boost export
earnings. Presently there is only manganese and gold being
mined in the region. In 1988 industry contributed 22-25
percent of GDP, but growth has been modest due to the small
size of the domestic market, lack of indigenous raw materials,
and shortages in finance and management skills. (ACR:1987/88)
The Gambia is also a country with a heavy reliance on
agricultural products, particularly groundnuts, for the bulk
of it's export. Fishing and livestock farming provide a lesser
share of foreign exchange. The industrial sector very
insignificant, and is regulated to groundnut processing (into
oil and cake), a leather tannery, and a salt and brick-making
plant.
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Agriculture employs more than 70 percent of the working
population in Ghana and provided a similar percentage of
foreign revenue in 1988. Cocoa and timber remain the biggest
component of agriculture, with cocoa being the single largest
export earner. However, the cocoa industry has been plagued by
falling production throughout the past decade and was severely
damaged by drought and brush fires up to 1984. Since 1983 the
Government has had a very close association with the IMF and
all it's economic policies has been backed by massive
injections of foreign capital from the IMF as well as Western
sources. (ACR:1986/87,p.B37) Although primarily an
agricultural based economy, with the primary sector accounting
for almost half of all economic activity, Ghana also has a
substantial heavy industry sector consisting of an oil
refinery at Tema and a small oil producing field at Saltpond,
although almost all her oil needs are imported. The mining of
key minerals--gold, manganese, diamonds and bauxite--have also
been accelerated in recent years. Rail transport have been
improved with external grants, and most of the logs,
manganese, and bauxite are transported to the harbors via this
medium. Electricity from two hydroelectric dams at Akosombo
supplied by the Volta river is the country's chief power
source. Ghana exports hydroelectric power to both Togo and
Benin, and the dams also supply an aluminum smelter owned by
the Volta Aluminum Company (VALCO), a subsidiary of Kaiser
Aluminum of the United States. However, most large-scale
enterprises relying on imported inputs under-utilize their
installed capacity. It was estimated that only 25.5 percent of
Ghana's installed capacity in manufacturing was utilized in
1980, having contracted from 40.4 percent in 1978. (Adejugbe:
1986) Ghana also have a number of light industries producing
finished products, including bricks and tiles, footwear, fruit
canning, small metals, pharmaceuticals, paints, and paper.
However, the gloomy side of the recent economic boom is the
debt burden. Debt service alone took over one-third of export
earnings in 1985 and two-thirds in 1986.
Mali is a nation whose vast majority of the population earn
their livelihood through agriculture, animal husbandry, small
scale fishing, and related occupations. Industry accounted for
only 10 percent of GDP in 1985, with agro-industry, and
particularly food industries, the most important in this
sector with textiles ranking second. (ACR:1983/84) State
enterprises and above all the 'Office du Niger' have built and
operated industrial plants producing rice, sugar, and edible
oils from groundnuts. Other small industries are engaged in
making cigarettes, matches, aerated water, canned tomatoes,
and beer. Cotton is a major source of export earnings, and
also supplies Mali's three gins and edible oils industry. The
textile industry, using locally-grown cotton, provides almost
all the local needs in weaving, bleaching and dyeing, as well
as making knitwear and printed cloth. Factories related to the
rural sector also turn out leather goods, cement, and building
materials. Other factories make bicycles, sacks, and
agricultural equipment. (ACR:1982/83) The "People's Pharmacy"
has become one of the biggest in West Africa, producing dozens
of pharmaceutical products, some of which are traditional
medicines using local medicinal herbs.
Mali has many different minerals in it's subsoil, including
manganese, phosphates, iron, bauxite, salt, and gold; but few
of these deposits exist on a commercial scale. Currently only
the extraction of salt, phosphates, and the recent mining of
gold has come into production. Mali is also involved in a
large scale regional dam-building program, with aims of
providing irrigation and hydropower from the Senegal river.
The country currently supports two solar plants. Mali's
economy was devastated in the 1980s by drought exacerbated by
the depression in the world cotton market and a heavy debt
burden, causing adoption of a privatization scheme in 1987.
Niger's population is 90 percent rural and agricultural,
with the bulk of the population depending on farming and
livestock production. Niger's main cash crops--cotton,
groundnuts, sugar cane and tobacco--supply a small agro-
industrial sector. Textiles, edible oils, refined sugar,
frozen meat, and flour produced from indigenous sources
constitute the bulk of Niger's industry and accounts for much
of it's domestic and African trade. (ACR:1981/82) The
manufacturing sub-sector is of minor significance, accounting
for less than 4 percent of GDP in 1986.
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Uranium deposits, discovered by the French Atomic Energy
Commission in 1955, are by far Niger's most valuable economic
asset and the basis for hope of it's future development. Niger
currently supports three mixed public and private uranium
mining companies. Uranium mining continues to be Niger's most
important export earning activity, accounting for up to 80
percent of its export earnings in the past. The 43 percent
fall in real terms, between 1978-1984, in the price per kilo
of uranium seriously disrupted their balance of payments and
contributing to the overall poor economic performance in
recent years. (ACR:1985/86) Niger is currently trying to
attain food self-sufficiency by concentrating on developing
the agricultural sector.
The Republic of Guinea is another nation whose economic
viability depend on it's minerals' performance on the world
market. It is the most important supplier of high-grade
bauxite producing more than a quarter of the world's reserves,
with a 60 percent alumina content. The mineral brought over 95
percent of the export reserves in the country in 1988.
(ACR:1987/88,p.B52) There are three major operational bauxite
projects--the Friguaia project owned jointly by French, Swiss,
Canadian and U.S. interests along with the Guinean government
which processes alumina; the country's largest bauxite project
at Boke producing for export, jointly owned by a U.S.
consortium and the Government; and the Kindia mine jointly
owned by the Government and the USSR, which takes 90 percent
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of the production per year for debt repayment.
Guinea took vital steps toward reducing it's dependence on
bauxite by reaching agreements on the development of iron and
diamond deposits in 1982. Iron deposits of extremely good
quality lie to either side of the Guinea-Liberia border at
Mount Nimba. Reserves were estimated in 1987 at one billion
tons with 65-67 percent iron ore content. (ACR:1986/87,p.B52)
Guinea has mined a modest amount of this ore through Mifergui,
a nine country consortium in which the Guinean Government has
a 50 percent holding. Exploitation of diamond reserves began
on an organized basis in 1984 with the inauguration of the
Aredor mine. Guinea is remarkably poor for a country having
such an impressive resource base. The greatest weakness in the
economy is the poor contribution of agriculture, partially due
to the concentration on bauxite production. Nearly 80 percent
of the population is engaged in agriculture, yet the country
is not yet self-sufficient in food. The industry and public
works sector remains small, accounting for roughly 15 percent
of GDP, with virtually no manufacturing activity. A clinker
grinding plant and a lubricants plant were the only two major
manufacturing developments since 1980.
Liberia's export economy is dominated by a reliance on iron
ore production, rubber, and timber, which accounted for the
majority export earnings in 1987. (ACR:1987/88,p.B77) Thus,
the economy was described as being near bankruptcy in the late
1980s, partly due to the low demand for these products on the
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world market. Iron ore itself has accounted for as much as 60
percent of export earnings in the past, with the largest
producer being a Liberian American-Swedish Minerals Company
(LAMCO), and three smaller mining companies engaged in
extraction. In 1985 LAMCO was engaged in talks with the
Mifergui consortium on the joint development of the Guinean
iron ore deposits and use of existing LAMCO facilities to
process the ore and transport it to the Liberian port of
Buchanan. But in 1987 it was announced that the Liberian iron
ore deposits at Mount Nimba will be depleted by 1990, and that
LAMCO would cease operation. (ACR:1987/88,p.B77)
World prices for natural rubber remained depressed
throughout the 1980s, reaching an all time low in 1983 and
causing the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company to announce the
closing of it's Cavalla rubber plantation in January of that
year. Other industrial developments include opening of the
first agro-machine factory in Monrovia in 1982. The company
planned to use labor intensive techniques to produce
agricultural tools and equipment for local use and export.
(ACR:1982/83,p.507) Amoco, the U.S. oil company, began
drilling for offshore oil in 1984. Liberia has also received
assistance from Libya for construction of a glass factory in
1987. But increased debt, worsening export markets, and
declining investments, prompted the World Bank and IMF to
suspend operations in 1987, claiming the government had not
seriously attempted to reform the economy.
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Iron ore was the Mauritanian economy's mainstay throughout
the 1970s, contributing as much as 75 percent of exports and
20 percent of GDP. But the iron ore exports of Mauritania also
suffered in the 1980s due to depressed world market for steel.
The major mines at Zouerate is expected to continue production
only to the end of the 1980s before it becomes depleted. In
anticipation of the eventual exhaustion the Government and the
operating company (an international consortium with 29 percent
Arab capital), have opened the new Guelbs mines to replace
Zouerate. (ACR:1981/82,p.B486) The lower purity in the Guelbs
ore will have to be rectified by an enrichment process.
Nevertheless, due to heavy indebtness of the industry and low
world prices, the fisheries sector surpassed iron ore as the
country's main export by 1983. The Mauritanian coastline
represents one of the world's richest fishing grounds and
considered to be a potentially abundant source of foreign
exchange revenues. Fish export accounted for nearly 60 percent
of export earnings in 1986, compared to 9 percent in 1979. By
1988 Mauritania had a fleet of 250 boats, including 66 freezer
trawlers and 35 wet-fish trawlers. (ACR:1987/88,p.B97)
Other mining ventures include the Kuwait-Mauritania Company
exploiting gypsum reserves, and the State's Arab Mining
Company of Inchiri established a first-phase pilot factory for
processing copper and gold at Akjoujt. Also, an Algerian
financed sugar company and oil refinery has continually been
plagued by operating difficulties. A new cement plant, with
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Cuban assistance a national sugar refinery was opened in 1981
and 1983 respectively.
Although agriculture employs three quarters of the
population of Sierra Leone, with coffee, groundnuts, and
processed oils providing for some foreign exchange, the basis
of the economy remains mineral extraction, mainly diamonds.
The National Diamond Mining Company (DIMINCO), is the largest
producer. Other mineral exports of Sierra Leone include
bauxite, iron ore, rutile and gold, but their mining companies
make limited profits and have not been producing at full
capacity. The country's economic decline during the 1980s
center upon the fall in diamond production and world prices
for precious stones; the failure to develop other promising
mineral resources; and the pervasiveness of corruption in the
political and economic systems as well as the public service.
By September 1988 the Government's poor record of economic
management showed no sign of improvement, although President
Momoh declared in 1987 that his Government's economic
objectives were stability, better distribution of income and
wealth and promotion of self-reliance. Investment programme
priorities covering the period 1988-1991 include agriculture
and rural development, increased production of food and
commercial crops, higher incomes for farmers, reduced imports
of cereals and other food and-increased exports.
(ACR:1986/87,p.B150)
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Over seventy percent of the Togolese population is engaged
in the primary sector, with the vast majority practicing
subsistence agriculture. The main agricultural export product
are coffee and cocoa, palm oil and cotton. Phosphates,
however, is the most important export, constituting 33 percent
of exports in 1981. The single most important project
developed during the early eighty's was a phosphoric acid
complex to be built in Kpeae to process phosphates into acid
for export. Other prestige projects envisaged under their
ambitious Five Year Development Plan (1981-1985) include the
reopening of a petroleum refinery; expansion of the CIMAO
cementworks which is jointly owned with Ghana and Cote
d'Ivoire; and building of the first luxury hotel. Prospecting
for petroleum and studies being carried out on iron deposits
in northern Togo were in progress. The plan also provided for
the development of processing units for agro-industry, the
textile industry, and steelworks. The manufacturing is small-
scale, accounting for almost eight percent in 1986
But by 1982 the Togolese economy was in a parlous state.
Revenue from phosphate mining, agricultural exports, and
tourism all declined leaving the country with a foreign debt
exceeding $1 billion dollars. (ACR:1982/83) By 1985 Togo had
to bow to pressure from the IMF after failure to fulfill
international debt repayment by trimming their parastatal
sector and instituting a privatization scheme. The state-owned
oil refinery was leased jointly to Shell, BP, Texaco, and
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Mobil. By the end of 1986 four other companies had been
privatized, including: a dairy processing plant by a Danish
Company; a plastics factory by a Danish, German, and Dutch
group; an agricultural machinery plant was sold; and a textile
plant was bought jointly by an American group and South Korean
company. Other companies up for privatization as of 1987
include a cotton seed-oil processing plant, a detergent
company, a salt works, a transport company, a clothing
manufacturer and a galvanized iron works. (ACR:1986/87,p.B163)
The West African Development Bank also provided a loan to the
Pan-Atlantic Company (a Togolese, American-Korean Company) in
1988, for the purposes of modernizing two textile complexes.
The Industrially Advanced
In West Africa, only Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, and Nigeria are
the close to the point where their industrial base is
sufficiently varied to provide for basic domestic needs and
also produce a selection of manufactured goods for export. The
Senegalese economy has over 70 percent of it's workforce
employed in agriculture, which is considered weak due to heavy
dependence on the groundnut crop. Groundnuts is a major export
crop and the peasantry's main source of revenue. Cotton is the
other commercial crop, with rice and millet cropped for
domestic consumption. A great wave of investment in the period
1982-1984 was aimed at getting a number of major industrial
projects off the ground. From the beginning of the Development
Plan in 1981, the government has accorded priority to
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industry, particularly small industries which are extensions
of the agricultural market. It was estimated that between 1983
and 1987 approximately 420 industrial projects would start up.
These new industries would join the 400 companies in existence
in 1980, which made Senegal at that time the second leading
industrial nation of Sub-Saharan francophone West Africa
behind Cote d'Ivoire. Only 13 percent of Senegalese products
did not come from a factory in 1980. (ACR:1982/83,p.B569)
These industries, however, were primarily composed of the
manufacture of substitutes for unavailable imports including
building and construction materials, breweries, flour mills
vegetable oils works, textiles, soap and tobacco.
Manufacturing production accounted for about 17 percent of GDP
in 1987.
Major projects inaugurated in 1984 include the Chemicals
Industries of Senegal (ICS), representing large scale "second
generation" projects created to increase production of
finished products. ICS is building two factories, the first
intended to produce sulfuric and hydrochloric acid and a
second fertilizer plant, both near Dakar. Aside from
phosphates, salt is Senegal's only other mining product. Five
new factories also obtained Planning Committee authority by
January 1983 to set up in the free industrial zone of the port
of Dakar. These new projects include factories for plastic
footwear, household appliances, manufacture of cocoa powder,
edible groundnuts, and hair products. (ACR:1982/83,p.B568)
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The major irrigation projects are the Diama Dam at the mouth
of the Senegal river which began operation in 1985, and the
Manantali dam which was finished by the end of March 1988.
Other than irrigation purposes, the dams are designed to
prevent salt water from the Atlantic from intruding at Diama,
to allow for uninterrupted navigation, to give Mali access to
the ocean, and to produce electricity at Manantali.
Fishing is the third leading sector in the economy,
employing 10 percent of the working population in 1988. A ten
year plan to develop the sector included the purchase of 26
tuna boats and 47 trawlers by 1990. The Dakar Marine shipyards
went into civil operation in 1982, dealing 254 vessels,
including 200 fishing boats. Feasibility studies of iron ore
deposits in the Faleme were also completed in 1982, as well as
investigation for gold and uranium in eastern Senegal. By July
1983 the Sabodala Mining Company was set up to mine gold in
eastern Senegal. Tourism occupies fourth place in Senegal's
export receipts, after groundnuts, phosphates, and fishing,
and is expanding rapidly.
In February 1986 the Senegalese government announced the New
Industrial Policy (NIP), whose aim was to re-orient
manufacturing previously for home market, toward export
markets. (ACR: 1985/86,p.B152) This initiative, which was
fully implemented in 1987, was to force factories to modernize
by exposing them to stronger competition. Almost all
restraints were to be taken off of imports by 1988, and
survival of domestic businesses would depend on how
competitive they can be. It is hoped that this policy will
lessen the dependence of import substitution industries whose
national and regional markets are often affected by drought
conditions and earn a small amount of foreign exchange.
In the first two decades since independence, Cote d'Ivoire
sustained a relatively phenomenal annual growth rate of 7
percent, one of the highest in all of Sub-Saharan Africa. By
1981 it ranked third in GNP per capita among the Sub-Saharan
countries. The authorities attributed the key to this success
on the pursuit of consistent development policies aimed
primarily at the expansion of the agricultural sector. Whereas
in the Nigerian case the funding of industrialization have
come from the mining sector, the petro-dollar, and the
accompanying inflow of foreign investment, that of Cote
d'Ivoire has been derived from savings generated from the
agricultural sector. But since the early 1980s growth has
slowed considerably, declining to a negligible rate in 1982.
The domestic economy was under severe strain during this
period, due to a large revenue deficit, compounded by the
rapid foreign debt incurred due to heavy borrowing when the
commodity boom precipitously ended in 1978 and caused
uncontrollable fluctuations of commodity prices in the world
market. However for all it's present difficulties, Cote
d'Ivoire is not a poor country, and is still credible as one
of the few development success models on the continent.
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Coffee, cocoa, and tropical hardwood exports remain the
dominant export revenue earners. They are being complimented
by exports of bananas, pineapples, and palm oil. Cote d'Ivoire
remains the world's premier cocoa producer and the third
largest exporter of coffee. Industry, construction and
transport contributed 24 percent to GDP in 1980 with the
combined capital of 619 private companies are owned 33 percent
by the government, 12 percent by individual Ivorians, 34
percent by French, 6 percent by Swiss, and 4 percent by U.S.
investors. (ACR:1981/82,p.451) However, the spectrum of
manufacturing in Cote d'Ivoire remains relatively
circumscribed, the sector is dominated by light consumer
industries. The manufacturing sector, which accounted for 16
percent of GDP in 1986, is mainly geared toward processing
agricultural commodities. It is concentrated on the foodstuff
sector (oil mills, canning factories, flour mills, plants
producing instant coffee and cocoa powder, sugar refineries);
the textile sector using local cotton; and timber and it's by-
products. Companies are also being set up in the metalworking,
petrochemical, plastics, and building sector.
(ACR:1982/83,p.B483) Cote d'Ivoire is also one of the three
(the others being Togo and Ghana) who operates CIMAO, the
largest company producing clinker for manufacturing cement.
The country has two small oil fields along with the Abijan-
Vridi oil refinery. In 1982 almost 90 percent of the country's
power was hydro-electrically generated.
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A number of negative development during 1983 highlighted
Cote d'Ivoire's deep-seated financial difficulties. Most
notably, severe drought reduced agricultural output and
virtually halted the generation of hydro-electricity, which in
turn, adversely affected the productivity of the industrial
sector as a whole. Economic activity declined, which led to a
shortfall in fiscal revenue. In 1984 and 1985 the country's
fortunes took turn for the better due to improved harvests and
world prices. Also in early 1985 the country's adoption of a
World Bank industrial sector reform scheme led to strong Bank
support for the country in negotiations with private and
bilateral creditors. The industrial reform scheme involved the
adoption of a new investment code, and a new tariff structure.
Under the new setup, tariffs will discourage the installation
of import-substituting industries, which would require
substantial government protection. At the same time, fiscal
incentives are being introduced for industries that generate
exported goods that consist primarily of transformed local
products. (ACR:1985/86,p.B74) Performance in the secondary
sector was positive in 1986, with the government putting the
overall growth at 6.8 percent and growth of manufacturing at 8
percent, although the growth rate has leveled off more
recently. The increased growth was attributed to the
combination of new policies and increased investment. The
greatest obstacle to further industrial progress in this
country is that the limits of industrialization through light
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consumer goods seem to have been reached, and constraints in
respect to foreign exchange to finance future ventures have
been built up (Adejugbe: 1986).
The manufacturing sector in Nigeria has been growing
steadily since independence, with the exception of the Civil
War years. The early post-independence period industrial
development concentrated on import substitution and the
processing of agricultural commodities for export. In 1958,
half of Nigerian industry consisted of the semi-processing of
primary raw materials for export such as palm oil refining,
rubber making, sugar, cotton textiles, and the production of
timber and veneers. But as a result of active government
policies in a country well endowed with natural resources,
Nigeria now has a larger number of important export
commodities than any other African country, ranging from agro-
based industries to large-scale heavy industry.
Aside from agro-industries, the manufacture of cement,
building materials, construction equipment, pharmaceuticals,
soap and detergent, cigarettes, plastic goods, electrical
accessories, and household goods, among others, all take place
in Nigeria. (ACR:1980/81,p.B587) The country's 58 breweries
were instructed in 1986 to be in a position to use only local
materials by 1990. An electronics industry was to be
established in collaboration with American interests. The
factory would produce refrigerators, television sets, radios,
and compressors. Progress on the construction of an indigenous
steel industry continued throughout the 1980s. The Aladja
steel plant at Warri was commissioned in early 1982. The high-
profile national project, the Ajaokuta steelworks was set to
be completed some time in 1990. In May 1983 the country's
third steel mill was commissioned at Oshogbo. Iron ore is
imported from Guinea, Liberia, and Brazil, and small deposits
found in Kwara State will help supply the Ajaokuta steelworks.
The automotive industry continually expanded in the last
decade with Britain, France, Italy, Australia, an Germany all
involved in joint ventures for vehicle assembly. The National
Truck Manufacturing Plant in Kano, of which 40 percent is
owned by Fiat, began production of trucks and tractors in
1982.
Despite a large secondary sector, the Nigerian Government
depend on oil for over 90 percent of export earnings. The
country opened it's third and largest oil refinery at Kaduna
in October 1980, built by a Japanese construction company. The
plant will produce lubricating oil, asphalt, sulphur, liquid
petroleum gas, gas oil, two grades of fuel oil, and kerosene.
It also has manufacturing units for steel drums and kerosene
tins. (ACR:1980/81,p.586) In October 1981, Mobil Oil Nigeria
discovered a new large oilfield offshore Cross River State.
Previous known oil reserves were estimated to last 20 years.
The long awaited petrochemical complexes finally came on-
stream at the end of 1987, and are producing a number of
products ranging from plastics and car parts to
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pharmaceuticals and paint. Nigeria also exported coal (to the
Netherlands) for the first time in September 1984 and the
country's first liquid natural gas recycling plant opened in
March 1985.
The precariousness of Nigeria's strong dependence on oil for
government revenue was made dramatically evident in 1980s,
when a slump in the oil market posed serious threats to the
country's internal and external financial position. Oil
earnings decreased in each of the first four years of the
1980. The steady fall in income caused the economy to go into
a prolonged recession. Nigeria's economic performance
continued to be poor throughout the latter half of the 1980s,
causing President Babangida to continue the Economic State of
Emergency to December 1988. In an attempt to break out of the
stagnation of previous years, the President introduced several
bold programmes during 1986, most notably the privatization of
parastatals and the devaluation of the national currency.
Current Trends in Manufacturing
In summary, the relatively more industrialized countries in
West Africa: Ghana, Togo, Senegal, Cote d'Iviore, and Nigeria
are all experiencing structural problems inherent in
industrialization through light consumer goods' industries
rooted in imported inputs. The economies of Guinea, Liberia,
and Mauritania rely preponderantly on their respective mining
industries, possessing only incipient and insignificant
manufacturing sectors. Burkina Faso, Mali, Sierra Leone, and
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Niger derive very little from mining but their respective
industrial sectors are not yet developed. They are basically
agrarian economies. The remaining countries can be
meaningfully described as not having really started with
industrialization.
There are a number of identifiable characteristics which are
common to all the nations of West Africa. Tables 3.1 and 3.2
show the sectoral distribution of economically active
population by country and the structure of merchandise
exports, respectively. Virtually all have a majority of their
populations employed in the agricultural sector, with a small
percentage employed in industry. In most cases, a large
proportion of GNP and foreign exchange earnings are derived
through a single commodity. This makes the economies dependent
on agricultural production highly vulnerable to climactic
conditions. During the 1983-1984 drought many of the economies
were devastated and thrust into prolonged recession. The
drought especially affected those countries which depend on
hydro-electricity to power industry. A pattern of production
that concentrates heavily on a very few export commodities can
also be viewed as a problem of dependence upon the
unpredictable vagaries of world demand and supply conditions--
a dependence that severely restricts a country's capacity to
influence it's own economic performance. A noticeable feature
of the geographical location of industries in West africa
shows a noticeable unevenness of distribution in each country.
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TABLE 3.1
ECOMOMICALLY
ACTIVE POPULATION:
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION (%)
BOTH SEXES
RGRICULTURE
1982 1986 1982
INDUSTRY
1986
SERVICES
1982 1986
BENIN
BURKINA FASO
CAPE VERDE
COTE D'IVOIRE
GAMBIA
GHANA
GUINEA
GUINEA-BISSAU
LIBERIA
MALI
MAURITANIA
NIGER
NIGERIA
SENEGAL
SIERRA LEONE
TOGO
SOURCE: Survey of Economic and Social Conditions in Africa,
New York: United Nations, 1988.
1986-1987.
68.40
86.20
50.00
63.20
83.45
54.55
79.40
81.60
73.30
84.55
68.30
90.35
67.20
80.15
68.10
72.35
68.80
85.40
46.40
59.55
82.65
52.30
76.95
80.15
71.75
82.85
66.40
89.00
66.75
79.40
65.35
70.95
7.10
4.40
23.35
8.75
6.90
18.30
9.60
3.60
9.10
2.15
9.15
1.75
11.90
6.60
14.75
10.15
7.85
4.70
25.35
9.65
7.30
19.30
10.80
3.80
8.75
2.40
9.70
2.05
12.40
6.65
16.10
10.70
24.50
9.40
26.65
28.05
9.65
27.15
11.00
14.80
17.60
13.30
22.55
7.90
20.90
13.45
17.15
17.50
27.15
9.90
28.25
30.80
10.05
28.40
12.25
16.05
19.50
14.75
23.90
8.95
21.45
13.95
18.55
18.35
TABLE 3.2
STRUCTURE OF MERCHANDISE EXPORTS
PERCENTAGE SHARES
AND
EQUIP.
1987 1965
OTHER
MANUFACTURES
1980 1987 1965
TEXTILES AND
CLOTHING
1980
BENIN
BURKINA FASO
CAPE VERDE
COTE D'IVOIRE
GAMBIA
GHANA
GUINEA
GUINEA-BISSAU
LIBERIA
MALI
MAURITANIA
NIGER
NIGERIA
SENEGAL
SIERRA LEONE
TOGO
FUELS, MINERALS,
AND METALS
1980 1987
OTHER
PRIMARY COMMODITIES
1965 1980 1987
BENIN
BURKINA FASO
CAPE VERDE
COTE O'IVOIRE
GAMBIA
GHANA
GUINEA
GUINEA-BISSAU
LIBERIA
MALI
MAURITANIA
NIGER
NIGERIA
SENEGAL
SIERRA LEONE
TOGO
SOURCE: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth. Washingto D.C.: The World Bank,
1965
MACH INERY
TRANSPORT
1980
1 0
1987
1965
99
100
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Generally, most of the industries are centered around national
capitals, ports, or in close proximity to the source of raw
materials, areas that are relatively more developed in terms
of infrastructural facilities and where large urban markets
for the products of industries are concentrated.
The type of manufacturing industries established in the
subregion as a whole is in the rudimentary stage and covers
items ranging from the production of raw materials to the
processing of primary products. Where there are modern
industrial plants, they are the usual light consumer, import
substituting industries, not based on local endowments. Nearly
all of the West African nations have similar low-technology
import substitution industries, consisting of food processing,
beer and other beverages, tobacco, textiles and clothing,
construction materials, and household goods. In most cases,
food products account for the majority of value added in
industry. It is common to have industry operating well below
capacity, and the secondary sector contributes no more than 25
percent of GDP, and in many cases much less. (Table 2.5) Since
most output is composed of final goods, the sales of output to
other sectors for use as input is very limited. Only in a
select few countries that industrial production covers such
items as chemicals and petroleum derivatives, metal and non-
metallic mineral products. Relatively heavy industries such as
oil refining, motor car assembling, electronics, and
electrical equipment can be found in only a few countries such
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as Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria. Even though the sub-region is
adequately endowed with natural resources, there is almost a
complete absence of highly sophisticated technology or heavy
engineering industry for the production of industrial and
agricultural machinery and equipment. Most of the industries
in the ECOWAS region, whether they be consumer or capital
goods industries, can be properly described as assembly or
fabricating industries dependent on imported components. The
net result is that backward and forward linkages in
manufacturing activities are almost non-existent. There has
been virtually no attempt to harness indigenous materials in
the manufacturing process.
There are also a wide range of ownership patterns of the
various types of industries within West Africa, including
government owned, a combination of government and foreign,
totally foreign owned expatriate industries, industries
privately owned by nationals, and cooperatives. Government and
foreign ownership is characteristic of heavy industry, while
government usually undertakes the responsibility of provision
of public goods such as transportation and power. Foreign
ownership generally pervades the mining sector. Recently, as
part of IMF and World Bank adjustment programmes, the
parastatal sector has been trimmed and in many cases a
privatization scheme has been instituted.
-Thus we find there is room for specialization within the
ECOWAS customs union, particularly around agricultural and
mineral processing. The pervasive replication of industries,
particularly around agro-based processing industries, could be
alleviated through the increased competition fostered by the
removal of domestic protective policies. The theory of customs
union, in effect, would stipulate a movement away from import
substitution (with it's emphasis on public sector
interventions and production of final-stage products), toward
a more judicious use of resource endowments by coordinating a
complementary industrial structure through regional
specialization. Obviously, of critical importance is the
location and type of industries ECOWAS policies would
prescribe in trying to enhance industrialization in the sub-
region, topics which customs union theory do not touch upon.
The promotion of intermediate and capital goods industries
would not only diversify the economies of West Africa, but
also limit their vulnerability to climatic changes. Also of
great importance are the policies the organization adopts
toward foreign capital investments.
The final chapter will first examine the current achievement
of the organization, with the following sections pointing out
the main obstacles to implementation and the policy
prescriptions ECOWAS has formulated to combat these problems.
83
Chapter Four
The Contribution of ECOWAS Towards Industrialization
Given the above analysis of the rudimentary state of
industrialization in West Africa, one begins to question the
relevance of the ECOWAS in promoting sustained and accelerated
development in the sub-region. The Economic Community of West
African States has some modest achievements to point to during
it's first fifteen years of existence. The organization's
stated priorities were to develop transport and
communications, agriculture, intra-regional trade, and
industry. But apart from the near completion of the
telecommunications, roadway, and other infrastructural
projects which have made substantial progress, ECOWAS has few
practical achievements to point to within other priority
areas. Aside from the formulation plans, studies, and
proposals, the areas of agriculture and industry have been
largely subject to low levels of achievement. Furthermore,
ECOWAS has had virtually no impact on alleviating the
generally negative economic situation in the sub-region,
particularly in these two productive sectors.
The reasons for this lack of success are varied. A number of
problem areas have perpetually hindered the realization of
ECOWAS' goals. This first and second sections of this chapter
will first summarize the current status of infrastructural
facilities and the ECOWAS achievements in these areas,
respectively, since these are the areas which the most
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progress has been made. A third section will be devoted to
those obstacles to implementation which must be resolved if
ECOWAS has any chance at becoming a viable and successful
customs union.
Existing Infrastructural Facilities
The ECOWAS Treaty establishes provisions for the general
mobility of human and material resources throughout the
community. It is envisaged that an integrated market in the
geographic sub-region should widen the scope for internal and
external economies of scale and improve factor availability
through a pooling of resources and interdependence among
member states. To develop such an integrated common market
presupposes the availability of satisfactory infrastructural
facilities (Ekong: 1980). In furtherance of this objective,
Chapter VIII of the Treaty provides for the evolution of
common transport and communications policies. This is spelled
out in the setting up of the Transport, Telecommunications,
and Energy commission whose functions are to:
... formulate plans for comprehensive network of
all weather roads; improvement and
reorganization of railway; harmonization and
rationalization of policies on shipping
and international airways... and merger of
national airlines within the community.
It is duly recognized that if the common market is to become a
reality,, the present poor telecommunications and transport
links between the ECOWAS states must be greatly improved.
See the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States.
Lagos, Nigeria, 1975. (Chapter VIII).
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The importance of information in commerce and industry
cannot be overstated. A good deal of industrial coordination
can be achieved by free and timely flow of information.
(Ezeife: 1980) Telecommunications services are indicative of
the regions backwardness. Prior to the current ECOWAS
sponsored telecommunications project, citizens of member
countries were unable to make direct telephone calls between
one capital and another without passing through Europe or
America. A concerted effort is needed to improve the
telephone, telegraph, and postal system within the region.
Unless speed, convenience, and reliability are achieved, the
hoped-for integrated industrial development policy will have
limited success.
Adequate transportation links is an integral part of the
production and distribution process. For not only does
transportation assemble raw materials at factory points and
finished products at points of consumption, it also stimulates
regional specialization and division of labor. Hence an
integrated transport system becomes a determining factor in
the location of production facilities. (Ekong: 1984a) A whole
region can become a large market for production depending on a
good transport network. Neither large scale production nor
mass distribution are possible without efficient and
relatively cheap transportation. An integrated system is a
critical factor in regional growth by determining the extent
an area or region can capitalize on it's endowments.
Although geographically ECOWAS is cohesive, the existing
transport network can hardly be said to be efficient in terms
of intra-community transport costs, having been designed not
to facilitate intra-regional trade, but trade with overseas
countries. Each of what are now independent countries within
ECOWAS maintain separate systems (if some can be called
systems at all) among the various transportational modal
agencies. Almost all major roads in the sub-region radiate
from the major towns on the seaboard to connect populated
settlements, agricultural and industrial centers in the
hinterlands, and have little or no inter-territorial
connections even among neighboring countries. Thus the road
systems of the individual countries are incoherent and
uncoordinated.
The same is true of railway transportation. Each national
rail system is a separate unit and have nothing in common with
the lines of next door territories. The only exceptions are
cases where two or three contiguous territories were under the
same administering power were there common transport
development plans. Such was the case in Senegal-Mali and Cote
d'Ivoire-Burkina Faso rail lines. Almost all the existing rail
roads in the sub-region appear to have been connected to the
hinterland from the Atlantic seaboard. They were either linked
to the interior for major mineral resources, agricultural
belts, or population concentrations. Furthermore, road and
rail arteries bear no relationships developmentally and
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functionally to each other. (Ekong: p.249) It is believed that
the convenience of the colonial administration, pattern of
trade, and the needs of the extractive industries underlay the
pattern where the emphasis was focused on national export-
import trade than internal development.
Because the patterns of international trade between West
African states and the outside world, ocean shipping was
somewhat more developed than inland waterway transportation,
which is virtually non-existent. Pattern-wise, the region is
served mostly by ships or cartels of shipping companies of the
metropolitan ex-colonial nations of Europe, North America, and
Asia. A few important indigenous shipping lines in the sub-
region are owned by the governments of the separate
countries, however, the bulk of the overseas trade is carried
out by foreign shipping lines which dictate both quantums and
prices for services.
Intra-regional air services are a tiny subset of the total
air services of the region. Because air traffic fares tend to
be very costly, the number of customers traveling internally
are reduced to a tiny group of business executives, government
leaders and other high government functionaries making
official trips along with foreign visitors. The bulk of
international flights to and from the sub-region are handled
mostly by foreign airlines, although government owned
indigenous airlines operate the internal air services within
the states. Nigeria Airways and Ghana Airways are the most
prominent of this kind. Air Afrique is the only multi-national
airline run by a consortium of francophone governments,
whereas the single-nation enterprises are usually kept alive
by public subventions. The rising costs and technical
difficulties encountered by national airlines make the
proposal for and ECOWAS airline increasingly attractive.
Finally, the fuel and power sector seems to be the most
crucial, being the main stem on which all other
infrastructural issues hang. In other words, availability of
adequate fuel and power supplies are indispensable to the
growth, development and maintenance of the other
infrastructural facilities and the whole economy at large
(Ayodele: 1986) Considering the fact that energy resource
development has been previously pursued single-handedly by
member states, the worsening socio-economic conditions in West
Africa seem to be a strong enough incentive to pave the way
for an effective cooperation arrangement given the current
peculiarities of sub-regional energy problems, including
acute electrical supply shortages and scarcity of petroleum.
The member states of the ECOWAS show an uneven distribution
of energy resources, although the overall resources can cope
with the energy needs of the subregion. Only Nigeria can be
classified as an oil producer/exporter, while crude production
in Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, and Benin can best be described as
experimental. The Nigerian crude reserves are of such high
quality, that it can also be used to produce high-technology
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derivatives such as jet-fuels for export outside the region.
Nigeria also has large quantities of untapped natural gas
reserves. Virtually every state now produce it's own
hydroelectric resources, with some such as Ghana being net
exporters of electricity. In fact, the ECOWAS has an abundance
of energy resources that could satisfy regional demand and
also exported since a sizeable proportion of energy potential
has not been exploited. In effect, the sub-region can become a
net producer of energy and the implications of this fact for a
region-wide energy policy is far reaching. On the basis of
exploitable resources and the production of primary energy
vis-a-vis consumption, it can be concluded that ECOWAS has a
sound fuel and energy base for industrial development. It is
apparent that the advantages of ECOWAS's abundant energy
resources can be fully exploited if technologies and capital
can be mobilized at the sub-regional level.
In summary, the patterns of infrastructural facilities in
the ECOWAS sub-region are characterized by: fragmented
development characterized by a lack of regional cohesion;
outward-looking linkages with the ex-colonial capitals; and in
some cases extremely self-centered development efforts. There
evidently few or no efforts at coordinated plans between the
former colonial powers in terms of regional development. For
ECOWAS to become a reality, a proper strategy for development
of a functional infrastructural system is imperative.
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Current Achievements of the ECOWAS:
Telecommunications
The initial stage of the Pan-African Telecommunications
project "Intelcom", the first principal ECOWAS project linking
the West African capital cities is already completed, financed
by the ECOWAS Fund. The Fund made loans totalling $12.5
million for linking Benin, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Cape Verde,
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Burkina Faso for completion of the
first phase of the project, making it possible to have easy
telephone access between these countries. Phase two of the
project, linking Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and
Senegal was partially financed by the European Investment Bank
(EIB). Phase one was completed in April 1988 and phase two in
October of the same year. (ARB:3/89) Telephone and telex
links between Ghana and Togo was scheduled to open in March
1989, guaranteeing automatic dialing between the two
countries. The two projects would provide automatic microwave
telephone, telex, and television facilities for the countries
concerned. The total cost of the Telecommunications project is
estimated at $45 million, with the African Development Bank
(ADB), the EEC's Development Fund, and a number of European
banks agreeing to contribute loans. (ARB:3/89,p.9480) Apart
from the main preoccupation of promoting the establishment of
a modern telecommunications network that links all national
capitals, the community's programme also includes provisions
for maintenance and training.
Transport
The improvement of the existing roads and construction of
new ones according to international standards would become one
of the main approaches to forming an integrated transport
system within ECOWAS. New trunk roads cutting across the
frontiers are planned, but as the first step in the transport
programme, road signs, regulations, and procedures are to be
harmonized to encourage the use of existing links. (ARB:6/81)
Both lateral routes and the predominantly interior-to-coast
roads are to be developed. A trunk road linking Nauakchott in
Mauritania, with Chad (which lies outside ECOWAS), is
envisaged as well as one linking Mauritania's capital with
Lagos (Nigeria)--much of this link already exists. (See Map 2)
Work on this trans-West Africa highway running from
Nauackchott to Lagos is well advanced. Roads and bridges
linking Benin and Togo were completed in February 1989 at a
cost of $2.2 million financed by the ECOWAS fund. The section
linking Liberia and Sierra Leone has also been completed with
$3.3 million from the ECOWAS fund. (ARB:3/89,p.9480) Finance
is also being put in place for a Dakar-N'Djamena Trans-
Sahelian route and in April 1988 a meeting of donor
organizations, led by the World Bank, agreed to provide
finance amounting to $276 million for constructing and
improving roads in the region. A regional motor insurance
scheme was launched in 1984 and a revised regional road map is
being drawn up in collaboration with the ECA. (Europa: 1990)
Map 2: Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS): proposed new trunk roads.
Source: B.U. Ekong. "Transportation and the Economic
Community of West African States", in Readings and
Documents on ECOWAS. Lagos: The Nigerian Institute
of International Affairs. (1976),444
Rail transport development by ECOWAS, however, has not
advanced far, but it is realized that two systems of rail
lines are required for ensuring the objective of a functioning
economic community: the north-south rail lines which form the
existing national lines, extended to link up with a proposed
east-west rail trunk. (See Maps 3 and 4) Other proposed rail
links include one between Guinea and Mali and one between
Lagos (Nigeria) and Accra (Ghana).
Other transport and infrastructure projects remain in the
early planning stages partly due to the economic restructuring
of a number of member states. Nonetheless, a feasibility study
on the establishment of an ECOWAS shipping line was completed
in 1984 and in 1986 a data bank was established to monitor the
traffic in West African ports. A four member team of Canadian
experts began a study designed to improve the airline
operations in the region. The study aims at promoting
cooperation among the region's airlines and increasing their
profitability by examining administrative and legal problems,
operational costs, commercial policies, navigation training,
and services. Discussions concerning the possibility of
creating an ECOWAS airline, which would operate alongside the
national companies, was held in September 1989 among civil
aviation directors and directors of the West African national
airlines. The results of the series of studies point to the
viability of a regional airline. (ARB:8/89)
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Energy
The creation of an Energy Resources Development fund was
approved in 1982. In October 1983 it was announced that a
regional information center and data base was to be set up in
Dakar, Senegal, to disseminate information on renewable
energy. A proposed natural gas pipeline system linking Nigeria
to the 16 member nations was estimated to cost 3.6 billion
dollars. The project is to completed in three stages, aimed at
effectively utilizing the abundant gas reserves in the Niger
delta area. It is projected that based on proven reserves, gas
could be supplied to the sub-region for the next 30 years.
(ARB: 12/85) In 1987 plans were announced for the construction
of an ECOWAS refinery, to supply refined petroleum products
for the region. It was also announced in 1987 that ECOWAS
plans to set up a solar village in the sub-region as a part of
a move to diversify energy resources. According to the
Nigerian Guardian newspaper, the village will meet it's energy
needs not only from solar sources but also from wind and
biomass. The village will also serve as an ECOWAS center for
investment opportunities, technological development of
renewable energy resources and a pilot research project for
promoting the commercialization of the concept of harnessing
solar energy.
Agriculture
The community's commitment to food self-sufficiency by the
year 2000 has been strengthened by developments in the
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promotion of the Agricultural Development Strategy adopted in
1982. Particular attention is being paid to the creation of
seed production centers; the harmonization of agricultural
pricing policies; control of animal diseases; development of
cattle breeding centers; control of floating weeds; plants and
wildlife protection schemes; and support programmes for the
development of crop production. (WA:1989,p.1122) Seven seed
selection and multiplication centers and eight livestock-
breeding centers were designated in 1984. In 1988 it was
announced that ECOWAS is to establish a cattle-ranch in
southern Mali, over an area of 18,000 hectares, to breed
cattle for distribution in the ECOWAS subregion. (Europa:1990)
A subsidy agreement was signed between the U.S. International
Development Agency (USAID) and ECOWAS in August 1984 to
finance development activities in the field of agricultural
industry, fishing, and energy. The African Development Bank
also granted funds to ECOWAS in 1989 to finance agricultural
projects within member countries.
Industry
Cooperation in the field of industrial development is
fundamental to the success of ECOWAS. In pursuit of this
objective, the ECOWAS Treaty sets out guidelines on which
cooperation in industrialization in the subregion would be
based. Specifically, Industrial Development and Harmonization
are the subject of Chapter 5 (Articles 28-32) of the ECOWAS
Treaty which consequently deals with the issue of industrial
integration in the subregion. The ECOWAS "Industrial Policy
and Programme" was approved by the Council of Ministers in
Dakar in November, 1979. The policy emphasizes three major
factors. The first factor relates to the identification of
crucial industrial sectors which lend themselves to harmonized
efforts by ECOWAS member states in their development. The
Heads of State formally agreed in 1983 to give priority to
those industries which contribute to the development of the
following sectors: 1) the rural sector in order to achieve
self-sufficiency in food and raise the standard of living of
the rural population, 2) transport and communications, and
infrastructure, 3) natural resources, and 4) energy sector.
(WA:1983, p.1333)
The second important element in the ECOWAS Industrial Policy
and Programme is focused on the establishment of Community
enterprises. This is a step that could be the key to rapid
regional development. The protocol relating to the Community
enterprises has created the legal basis for regulating the
establishment and operation of regional multinational
industrial projects. The ECOWAS regional company is to be the
vehicle through which the general industrialization,
particularly the priority sectors of industry in the Community
are to be developed. The third and final aspect of the ECOWAS
industrial policy is concerned with the location of regional
industries, a process that is guided by two principles: the
requirements of an equitable distribution of the benefits
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derived from community action, and the objective of balanced
development of the sub-region. To this end, the ECOWAS
industrial policy will focus special attention on the even
distribution of regional industries over the sixteen member
states and the identification and location of at least one
major regional enterprise in each state. (Asante: p.87)
The basic instrument for the integration and industrial
harmonization in the Community is the proposed trade
liberalization programme. The trade liberalization programme
for industrial products, which was officially approved in May
1980 but was one of the most practical ideas that ECOWAS has
been stubbornly sitting on for years, was announced to be
operational on January 1, 1990. (ARB:1/90) Under the scheme
tariffs on agricultural products and handicrafts are to be
totally liberalized from the outset, while tariffs on
industrial goods are to be eventually phased out. The
programme is expected to stimulate intra-community trade and
revive the production base in the entire West African economy
by providing for the dismantling of tariff and non-tariff
barriers between member states.
The ECOWAS trade liberalization programme provides for the
gradual elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers on
mutual trade in manufactured products over a period of four to
ten years, depending on the categories of countries and
products. Community members have been split into three groups
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depending on levels of industrialization.' Those in the
highest industrialized bracket are expected to abolish tariffs
on priority products over the next four years and on non-
priority products over the next six. The second group is
expected to eliminate tariffs on priority products over six
years and non-priority over eight. The last group sets
elimination targets at eight years for priority and ten for
non-priority products. (ARB:1/90,p.9791) Thus the pace of
tariff reduction was to vary according to the priority given
to an industrial product and the country into which the
product was being imported. The higher the priority accorded a
product and the more industrialized the country, the faster
the tariff elimination would be effected. The process starts
with the commercialization of 26 priority products from the 16
members ranging from biscuits to plastic bags. For example,
four companies from Nigeria (including one brewery), are
allowed to export one product apiece. The list also includes
refrigerators and air conditioners manufactured in Benin,
bleach produced in Mali, and kitchen utensils from Ghana.
The following criteria were agreed upon for the selection of
priority industrial products, which should accelerate tariff
elimination: 1) The products should be manufactured by
industries established in the subregion and must fall under
' The first group consists of Senegal, Nigeria, Ghana, and Cote
d'Ivoire. The second group is made up of Benin, Sierra Leone , Liberia,
Guinea, and Togo. The rest of the nations comprise the third group.
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agreed priority industrial sectors. 2) The said products
should be given preferential treatment either because of
social considerations (food, housing, health and hygiene) or
economic considerations (contribution to industrialization,
job creation, value added). 3) The products should satisfy in
all cases the rule of origin. (WA:6/83) If the products are to
qualify for tariff removal, enterprises must, for example,
have a percentage of their capital in the hands of ECOWAS
states' nationals. National participation in the equity
capital of industrial enterprises was set to be at least 51
percent by 1989.
Also, as a complement to the trade liberalization programme,
the tenth annual summit meeting held in July 1987 officially
launched the ECOWAS Economic Recovery Programme (ERP). The
ECOWAS ERP identifies a listing of 136 projects to be
undertaken costing an estimated 1.67 billion dollars. Sixty-
four of the projects were said to be concerned with rural
development, 21 with transport improvements, and 23 with
industry. A small portion of the costs ($120 million) was said
to be secured and available for implementation of 16 projects
by the end of 1987. Forty of the projects are classified as
regional at a cost of $377 million. The executive secretary at
the meeting also announced that an industrial blueprint for
the area had been worked out to harmonize industrial policies
so -as not to concentrate certain types of producer industries
in one particular country. Seventy percent of the cost of the
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programme would come from sources outside of ECOWAS,
particularly the World Bank and the European Investment Bank.
However, it was reported at the twelfth summit held in 1989
that of the proposed 136 industrial projects launched two
years earlier, only nine obtained financing and seemed certain
of taking place.
Finally, ECOWAS has promoted the creation of a number of
potentially useful institutions and social organizations,
including the West African Clearing House, Ecobank, and the
Organization of West African Trade Unions. The West African
Clearing House, where all central banks can channel their
mutual transactions, was created to limit the dependence on
arrangements with European and American Banks in an effort to
reduce the dependency on foreign exchange. Ecobank
Transnational Inc. in Lome, Togo opened in March 1988 with an
authorized capital of $100 million--with 30 percent of it's
shares held by Nigerians. The bank will endeavor to supplement
private investment with resources from national and
international development agencies. The establishment of the
bank provides special trading advantages for the ECOWAS
countries by mobilizing the region's resources, and promoting
public and private investment. Four organizations have also
been established by the Executive Secretariat: the
Organization of Trade Unions of West Africa; the West African
Youth Association; the West African Universities Association;
and the West African's Women's Association.
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Potential Obstacles to Integration
It becomes apparent from the above evaluation of
achievements that ECOWAS has only had a limited amount of
success toward full implementation of the lofty aspirations of
the Treaty. The achievements have especially fell short in the
implementation of the industrial policy and trade
liberalization programme envisaged by the Community. The next
section identifies and elaborates on the five of the most
pressing constraints to industrialization in the economic
community. The constraints are not listed in any type of
ranked order, nor are they mutually exclusive so there is
quite a degree of overlap. The approach taken by ECOWAS
concerning these particular issues will determine the success
of the organization in achieving the goal of accelerated and
sustained economic growth in the West African sub-region.
Nationalism
One of the immediate factors affecting the approach to
integration is the growth of national consciousness within
African countries after independence. African countries which
for decades were treated as mere appendages of their former
colonial powers were anxious to discover their identities as
sovereign nations. Their immediate concern was to construct
themselves politically, economically, and culturally. They
were anxious to build viable nation states, based on their own
traditions and customs, and on the promises held out to the
masses. (Green and Krishna:1967) This put political leaders in
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a paradoxical situation. Independence has imposed the
obligation on leaders to produce some immediately tangible
results which have a direct bearing on the welfare of the
masses. At the same time, effective integration requires a
commitment over time, and an operational acceptance of the
restraints it imposes on national sovereignty. To a large
extent, the consciousness of newly won independence tends to
influence the general approach to economic integration as well
as the details of integration, especially in the case where
the interests of each state must be appeased. As a result,
Heads of State have used their veto power to protect and
advance national rather than regional interests.
Thus, national leaders are faced with a dilemma. Since
meaningful cooperation imposes long term commitment, there
would be understandable reluctance to undertake decisions
which would restrain national sovereignty in certain key
areas, including economic and social development plan
formation, and particularly in times of economic crisis. It
would be expected that the need for closer economic
cooperation would be more keenly felt at a time that many of
the African countries are facing severe economic difficulties.
But ironically, it is precisely at such a time that the spirit
of cooperation seems to falter. Massive unemployment, critical
shortages of foreign exchange, deteriorating infrastructure,
low capacity utilization in domestic industries, and galloping
inflation, all would tend to increase the number of vested
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interests who might be adversely affected by trade
liberalization and other measures of regional cooperation,
thus creating an inward-looking atmosphere that would make
integration measures more politically difficult to accomplish.
(Onitiri: 1988) To the extent that national consolidation
receives higher priority, regional cooperation may have to be
shelved or pursued in a modest measure.
Related to the problem of nationalism and it's by-product of
national rivalries is that of competing ideologies which serve
to impede progress toward integration. Although all ECOWAS
states are committed to industrialization and development,
national strategies to attain these goals diverge. The varying
strategies toward industrial development often stem from
ideological and philosophical orientations. For whereas a
meaningful harmonization of industrial policies is predicated
on sharing of a common ideology and socio-economic objective,
the disparities among member states of ECOWAS in political
ideologies and philosophies reflecting their overall approach
to economic policy and their assignment and use of policy
instruments are most striking. (Asante: p.90) The 16 nations
range in economic philosophy from collectivist to self-styled
Marxist in Benin, to Nigeria with her mixed but "indigenized"
economy and Cote d'Ivoire with a capitalist outlook and
special relations with France. Since the relationship between
government and industry would vary considerably from country
to country, certain types of interventions may be acceptable
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in one country but unacceptable in others. These
considerations suggest that attempts to pursue a coordinated,
intra-regional industrial policy, as detailed in the ECOWAS
Treaty, may encounter much greater difficulties than those
involved in national industrial policy. The different
approaches to planning and the co-existence of ideological
diverse states within the single West African trading bloc
also raises issues relating to the role of foreign private
investment and relationships with third parties.
Foreign Capital
Another problem area which adversely affects the level of
industrialization in the ECOWAS relates to the community's
high degree of foreign involvement and inputs in the
industrial sector of the sub-region. Imported capital is still
a very important component of the industrial sector because of
the relatively underdeveloped capital goods industry within
the subregion. As mentioned earlier, the utilization of a high
degree of foreign technology and capital is featured in the
large-scale import substitution industries such as brewing,
chemicals industry, and especially oil-refining and motor
vehicles assembly. Thus, transnational corporations (TNCs) and
other extra-regional actors could be considered one of the
strongest actors in regional cooperation. Transnational
Corporations can play the role of distorting the costs and
benefits in an integrated framework by interfering with
efforts by an African integration group to allocate industries
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to different members of the system. In a situation where
foreign capital is not regulated through a central agency, one
can expect continued concentrations in countries with
political stability, developed infrastructure, large
population, and perhaps oil. Unless adequate measures are
adopted, a situation could be created whereby the advantages
from regional economic integration are primarily realized by
transnationals that undertake the production, marketing, and
distribution of commodities produced from integrated
industries.
As the situation currently stands, foreign capital has a
free hand in the regional economy. Indeed, to fulfill the
integration process, ECOWAS would need considerable foreign
capital and assistance. In fact, direct foreign investment can
be an important stimulus to economic growth and social
development. Thus the fundamental dilemma facing the West
African countries in their integration process concerns the
reconciliation of their acknowledged need for foreign capital
and technology versus the evolution of their own autonomous
entrepreneurial class as well as the process of local private
capital accumulation. (Asante: p.1l6)
A position of ECOWAS with regard to the adoption of measures
at the regional level designed to reduce the dependence on
metropolitan countries have not yet materialized. However, in
recent years the organization has moved progressively forward
in adopting a possible approach toward foreign investment. The
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protocol on the rules of origin anticipated the problems posed
by external linkages and accepts that "the promotion of trade
in goods originating in member states as well as the
collective development of the community requires indigenous
ownership and participation"8 . The rules of origin was meant
to ensure a reasonable level of participation of local factor
endowments in the industrialization process. The objective of
this measure is to ensure that governments or nationals of the
community hold a reasonable percentage of equity capital in
industrial enterprises. However, although ownership is one way
of acquiring control, it is not the only one and sometimes not
the most effective. For ownership, either wholly or in part,
is not a sufficient condition to assure control of a foreign
enterprise. For example, even the 51 percent indigenous
ownership decree could merely give a false sense of
satisfaction because, in practice, the management will still
probably lie in the hands of the TNCs who can manipulate
decisions in their favor. Unless a transfer of ownership is
matched meaningful transfer of crucial managerial powers, TNC
control may prove to be largely illusory.
Lastly, it must be noted that changing the pattern of trade
is as well a political decision as it is an economic decision.
Member countries of ECOWAS will have to make conscious and
deliberate efforts to re-orientate their trading interests
" See "Protocol Relating to the Definition of Concept of Products
Originating from Member States of the Economic Community of West African
States, 5 November 1976, Articles II, IV, and V.
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inward within the community, rather than outwards toward
Europe, Asia, or America. This policy does not represent
autarky, but rather development through regional self-
reliance.
Structure and Component of Manufacturing
In conformity with the neoclassical theory of customs unions
by which trade obstacles between countries are eliminated and
by which trade barriers are maintained vis-a-vis third
countries, customs unions ought to lead in principle to the
intensification of intra-community trade. But the theory would
seem to have small relevance by way of removal of trade
barriers, if countries have little trade or industry between
them. A close look at the West African subregion shows that
almost all countries are primary producers and their products
are likely to compete rather than complement each other. They
possess similar resource endowments and are retarded in
industrial productive capacity. This similarity of primary
produce in the region constitutes a serious constraint on the
scope of intra-African trade expansion in the community. As
suppliers of raw materials and agricultural products in the
international division of labor, they inevitably compete for
markets, foreign capital, and technology. (Oloko: 1985) This
situation would seem to present a serious obstacle to the
overall goal of economic union.
The traditional output of the countries of ECOWAS, as
analyzed in chapter three, has been in the land-abundant
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commodities, particularly agricultural and mineral products
which constitute a substantial part of exports, and light
manufactures. When any processing has been undertaken, it has
usually been very minimal and labor intensive. Most of the
output of ECOWAS countries find their market in, and most of
their manufacturing inputs and domestic needs are imported
from, the developed countries. As a result, intra-African
trade constitutes a very small percentage of the total foreign
trade of West African countries, and linkage effects of the
manufacturing industries does not have much of a stimulating
effect on the economy. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the value and
percentage of ECOWAS intra-regional trade as compared to other
regional organizations in the developing areas. Trade among
member states in the ECOWAS totaled approximately 3 percent of
the group's international trade in 1987--about the same level
of intra-regional trade achieved during the early 1970s. (WB:
p.149)
Clearly, successful industrialization in ECOWAS will require
a reorientation of both the composition and patterns of trade.
If the countries in the ECOWAS region want to improve their
prospects of development they must first begin to plan to move
away from the first stage of industrialization with it's
emphasis on food, beverages, and textiles, to where they
produce intermediate inputs, capital equipment, and consumer
durables. The policies and programs instituted by ECOWAS
should have direct linkages and multiplier effects throughout
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TABLE 4.1
MUTUAL TRADE PERFORMANCES OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION
GROUPINGS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1970-1986
Value of intra-grouping trade
(ExporEs~inmiTions of~Uniteditates1Dollars)
Country group 1970
61
33
73
2
1290
109
299
73
1980
1056
200
296
2
5
10270
955
1141
354
.. 4830
43 500
860 11918
47 517
1981
944
146
396
3
7
11180
944
379
890
12651
632
1982
900
150
374
3
7
10400
1167
820
414
5050
1645
16109
688
1983
860
80
406
7
5
8200
1037
840
360
3570
2391
17080
1120
1984
500
100
306
4
10
8120
772
780
316
3700
2510
14428
1758
1985
481
50
297
4
10
6779
672
671
340
3300
2410
12713
1026
SOURCE: "Recent Developments in the Economic Integration Process of
Developing Countries". (New York: UNCTAD, 1988). TO/B/C.7/AC.3/4
Note: Data for 1986 are provisional estimates compiled and computed
by the UNCTRO secretariat from information provided mainly by the
secretariats of the integration groupings. Data for GCC countries are
compiled from a report of the ESCWA secretariat (E/ESCWA/DPO/87/21).
AFRICR
ECOWAS
UDEAC
CERO
MRU
CEPGL
AMERICA
ALAOI
ANDEAN
CACM
CARICOM
1986
ASIA
GCC
ECO
ASEAN
BANGKOK
Agreement
491
84
300
8
8220
662
620
300
2620
1752
11807
1000
Country group 1970
TABLE 4.2
Intra-grouping trade as a percentage
of total exports of each grouping
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
RFRICR
ECOWRS
UDEAC
CERO
MRIJ
CEPGL
AMERICA
ALROI
ANERN
CACM
CAPICOM
2.1
3.4
9.1
0.2
10.2
2.3
26.8
7.3
ASIA
GCC
ECO
ASEAN
BANGKOK
Agreement
1.1
14.7
1.5
3.9
4.1
6.9
0.1
0.2
13.5
3.5
22.0
6.4
3.0
2.7
17.8
1.8
4.6
3.0
10.1
0.1
0.2
12.6
3.4
20.7
7.4
4.2
18.9
1.9
4.1
3.6
10.7
0.1
0.2
13.2
4.5
21.8
9.0
4.2
6.4
23.3
2.1
4.1
2.0
11.6
0.1
0.2
10.2
4.3
21.8
9.3
3.9
4.8
23.1
3.2
2.5
4.1
7.4
0.4
0.7
9.2
3.3
19.7
4.2
4.1
11.0
18.5
4.3
2.5
2.0
7.1
0.4
0.8
9.6
3.1
15.9
5.5
4.6
10.0
17.9
2.5
SOURCE: "Recent Developments in the Economic Integration Process of
Developing Countries". (New York: UNCTAD, 1988). TO/8/C.7/AC.3/4
Note: Data for 1986 are provisional estimates compiled and computed
by the UNCTAO secretariat from information provided mainly by the
secretariats of the integration groupings. Data for GCC countries are
compiled from a report of the ESCWA secretariat (E/ESCWA/DPO/87/21).
1986
3.2
2.8
6.5
0.5
11.8
3.3
18.0
5.5
4.6
9.1
17.5
2.2
the economy. Special attention should be given to those
projects which promote job creation for both urban and rural
residents in the sub-region, as well as increase productivity
and growth in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors.
The net effect would be to increase the value added of
industries in the individual nations and in the region as a
whole, which is a primary goal of industrialization.
But even if the above major obstacles are alleviated intra-
community trade may not increase, for there are a second
subset of factors that will assume more importance as the
trade liberalization scheme takes effect. First, before the
birth of the community, marked differences existed between
member countries in the importance and structure of tariffs
and quantitative restrictions as sources of government
revenue. The tariff was viewed as a taxation instrument
available to national authorities to be deployed in the
raising of revenues or allocation of national resources. In
this respect the tariff carries with it a certain degree of
flexibility. It is this degree of national flexibility which
regional tariff harmonization removes from national
authorities, and it's removal imposes some element of
constraint on their freedom of action. Currently most ECOWAS
countries depend heavily on customs receipts for a majority of
government revenue. Consequently, a great deal of importance
is- attached to customs duties as a share of their foreign
trade and GDP, as well as their total government revenue.
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Relying solely on fiscal compensation for tariff revenues lost
also disregards the benefits that a country forgoes, notably
in the shape of increased value-added and employment in
manufacturing, when it imports from it's partners instead of
producing import substitutes for itself, where the option
exists. In other words, even that part of trade expansion that
involves trade creation--actual in the case of existing
industries, potential in the case of those planned--may
involve a cost. (Robson: p.2 3 ) The slow and cautious movement
toward trade liberalization therefore represents a political
compromise between those fearing a loss of national revenues
would create domestic economic and political problems and
those wanting much quicker implementation. (Okolo: 1985)
Finally, rival organizations in the sub-region, particularly
the francophone Communaute' Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest
(CEAO)9 , and to a lesser extent, the Mano River Union (MRU),
have been seen as an obstacle to trade liberalization and
intra-community trade. These groupings also aim at either
elimination of tariffs, or preferential treatment on trade.
Both organizations have asked to be relieved from treaty
obligations that provide most favored nation status to all
ECOWAS members. Since CEAO members have already made progress
in liberalizing their tariffs on trade with one another,
granting most favored status to all ECOWAS and proceeding with
* The members of CEAO are Cote d'Ivoire, Benin, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, Senegal, and Burkina Faso.
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ECOWAS' tariff liberalization schedule would disadvantage them
and undermine CEAO. (Lancaster: 1985)
Gains From Trade
Many of the problems faced by ECOWAS, particularly those
which will affect the industrialization process in the sub-
region, stem from the wide disparity in the strength of the
economies of member states reflected in their level of
development and natural resource endowments. Based on the
purported advantages derived from integration in theory,
benefits will accrue to the member of a grouping as a whole,
but for individual members the gains are unlikely to be
equitably distributed. Removal of trade barriers in the
community is bound to affect producers in varying degrees.
Critics of ECOWAS contend that the community will create a
free zone which will favor the more developed West African
countries at the expense of the economically less-advanced
countries. The argument is that given the tendency of
industries to cluster in a few growth points, capital
investments will gravitate to the industrial centers such as
Nigeria or Cote d'Ivoire. Due to their relatively higher per
capita incomes and large domestic markets, overhead capital
offers higher returns in these more advanced nations than in
others. Thus, the benefits deriving from integration would
tend to accumulate disproportionately to the advantage of
those areas which already enjoy a higher degree of
development. Corrective mechanism are essential to deal with
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this tendency of unions to exaggerate economic asymmetries if
integration is to be durable.
Compounding this problem is the fact that member countries
of any regional organization would usually have different
views on the future outlook of industrial development and it
would not be easy for them to agree on which industries in
which countries should be protected and by what policies.
Secondly, intra-regional coordination of industrial policy is
likely to create a serious opposition to interests in regard
to the distribution of industries. In this regard, the
community will have to come to terms with a strategy for
determining industrial location and evenly distributing the
gains from trade among member states. It follows that the
establishment and effective implementation of a fair and
acceptable distribution formula is necessary for the
effectiveness and cohesion of integration arrangements.
Two types of mechanisms are normally employed to offset
perceived or objective unequal gains from integration and
polarization. The first is the compensatory or equalization
mechanism in which certain measures are taken to transfer some
of the gains from integration from those who benefit more to
those who benefit least or even suffer net losses. One such
measure is the collection and sharing of customs revenue in
accordance with a pre-negotiated formula which favors the
disadvantaged. The second type of mechanism for redressing
unequal gains is the corrective mechanism, so called because
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it entails measures which aim to create conditions of
industrialization and development at the poles of stagnation
and thus correct the underlying causes of polarization. While
the integration arrangements under the ECOWAS Treaty seem to
have equalizing elements, i.e. through the Fund for
Cooperation, Compensation, and Development, a viable
corrective scheme has not yet been formulated within the
Community.
To counteract the effect of unequal gains and polarization,
the ECOWAS Treaty establishes the Fund for Cooperation,
Compensation, and Development. The Fund is primarily a
development bank which earns income from its portfolio
investments. Its primary tasks include funding regional
development projects and dispersing compensation to member
states that suffer losses as a result of trade liberalization
and location of community enterprises. It's budget relies on
national contributions tallied on the basis of a co-efficient
which takes into account the Gross Domestic Product and per
capita income of member states. In effect, the least developed
nations in the sub-region contribute the smallest percentage
to the fund while the highly developed contribute a larger
percentage. After 1980, the Fund earned enough money to
finance it's modest annual budget without recourse to annual
contributions. The capital budget of the Fund in 1985 amounted
to -$90 million.
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Although the ECOWAS Treaty gives weight to the need to
promote a fair and equitable distribution of the benefits of
cooperation, it is doubtful whether the measures proposed are
adequate enough to make the less favored partners altogether
willing to make such sacrifices in the interest of overall
growth of the community. The organization must go beyond
articles 25 and 26 of the Treaty, which simply provides for
compensation to be paid for loss of revenue from tariff
reductions.
Monetary and Financial Matters
The final inhibiting factor to implementation of a viable
industrial strategy concerns monetary and financial matters.
As it would be that one of the principle benefits of
integration is the increase in intra-regional trade, fiscal
and monetary arrangements to facilitate this objective should
receive primary importance. To implement economic integration
require coordination by member states in this area. One of the
technical and specialized commissions set up by ECOWAS has in
it's area of competence the encouragement of monetary
cooperation and coordination among member nations. In other
words, one of the tasks of the Trade, Customs, Immigration,
Monetary and Payment Commission is to encourage the
establishment of a West African monetary union.
The creation of a West African monetary union would greatly
stimulate manufacturing production and trade in West Africa.
Transactions involving manufacturing could be financed through
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inter-territorial commercial bank transfers without having to
go through the central bank. The resultant growth in the
manufacturing industry would have beneficial and expansionary
effects on other sectors of the West African economy. This
would represent a major step forward in West Africa's march
towards self-sustained growth and overall development. In it's
most complete form, monetary union entails a group of
countries deciding to use a single currency. If however,
member countries of monetary union decide to retain national
currencies, they will at least undertake to make their
currencies convertible into one another at rigidly fixed
exchange rates. (Osagie: 1980)
The Community is currently working towards a single
currency, being worked out in cooperation with the IMF. But
there are considerable political and economic difficulties in
the way of creating a single monetary union in the region.
Probably the most important feature most likely to excite
negative emotion against an ECOWAS monetary union is the
surrender of national sovereignty over monetary policy. Given
the mystique which strangely links currencies with national
sovereignty and pride, the objective of a single monetary
union will not easily be achieved. The ECOWAS states are
attached to a variety of currencies, ten in all. Benin, Cote
d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Mali, -Niger, Senegal, and Togo are
using the CFA franc guaranteed by the French franc. Cape Verde
is attached to the Portuguese Escudo and Liberia uses the U.S.
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dollar notes and Liberian coins. The other seven countries
have their own currencies, which have no external links and
are totally inconvertible. This inconvertibility has induced
smuggling, stalled the trade liberalization scheme and
affected intra-community trade, and prevented some nations
from honoring financial obligations to the organization. The
diversity of fiscal policies in the various countries of West
Africa will pose considerable problems for any arrangement
for economic harmonization.
Whether or not West Africa eventually decides to form a
monetary union, the establishment of some clearing arrangement
is necessary to facilitate the achievement of expanding intra-
West African trade. Such an arrangement would replace the
existing system in which transactions and payments between
countries are dominated by convertible foreign currency. On
March 14, 1975 the central banks of 12 West African countries
signed the Articles of Agreement for the establishment of the
West African Clearing House. The Clearing House commenced
operations on July 1, 1976, for the purposes of centralized
arrangement of mutually compensated settlements of intra-group
transactions. Given the large number of currencies of the
membership of the Clearing House and the diversity of the
exchange arrangements involved, a stable unit of account had
to be introduced if the clearing system was to succeed in
increasing the use of regional currencies in the settlement of
intra-community trade. The unit chosen for this purpose was
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the West African Unit of Account, (WAUA), which is equivalent
in value to one special drawing right (SDR) of the
International Monetary Fund. (McLenaghan: 1982) Under the
Clearing House agreement, all central banks of member
countries has accepted the obligation to convert their own
currencies freely into the WAUA for all eligible
transactions', thereby largely eliminating the
inconvertibility of regional currencies.
The hope for the creation of a new West African currency
builds on the establishment of the clearing institution. After
the full attainment of a customs union, the Clearing House
would eventually be transformed into a West African central
bank, while national central banks would become it's branches.
(Endozien and Osagie: 1982) This new supranational monetary
authority would replace the various national currencies with a
single new currency, while the present national central banks
would play a leading role in the withdrawal of old national
currencies and the introduction of a new one.
However, for the monetary union of West Africa to become a
reality, the economic links, particularly in monetary matters,
with former metropolitan powers must be dismantled. There must
also be a willingness by member countries of ECOWAS to
cooperate and coordinate their major economic policies, as
According to Article VIII, section 3, of the Clearing House
Agreement, all current account transactions are eligible for clearing with
the exception of (a) those specified by the Exchange and Clearing
Committee, and (b) payments relating to trade in goods not originating in
member countries.
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well as allow the surrender of part of their national
sovereignty to the new supranational authority.
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Recommendations and Conclusions
Despite numerous setbacks, ECOWAS has some modest tangible
achievements to point to during it's fifteen year existence.
The near completion of the telecommunications and highway
projects are the most positive sign that the organization is
moving in the right direction. Indeed, regional infrastructure
projects are an indispensable prerequisite if a unified market
is to become a reality. The fact that these project took
priority and are the first to be financed showed the
organization's realization that adequate transportation and
communication facilities were required for the further
development and stimulation of critical sectors such as
industry, agriculture, and commerce.
Other developments within the past few years are evidence
that the organization is inching toward implementation of the
provisions of the Treaty. The West African Clearing House and
Ecobank are useful institutions which will eventually boost
intra-regional trade and investment. January 1, 1990 was the
date when trade barriers finally began to be dismantled by
member countries, an achievement which should also boost
intra-regional trade. A move toward a common currency is now
being considered, as well as the planning region-wide of rail,
maritime, and air links. ECOWAS has also adopted a number of
policies which can be instrumental in achieving greater
effective cooperation and integration.
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However, it is clear that ECOWAS has a number of pressing
problems which must be addressed, or they may eventually lead
to the disintegration of the union. The above analysis of the
constraints to integration transcends two broad policy issues
which the orthodox theory of customs union gives little
attention. The first issue involves the determination of
equity, the appropriate scope and direction of regional
development and specialization. A first and very important
observation concerning the integrative process among
developing countries is that the motivation for integration is
not more or less the consolidation of economies, but rather
the realization of economic goals. Integration has no
legitimacy apart from the legitimacy it would or could acquire
as a result of the accomplishment of these development goals.
(Mytelka: 1973) Integration in the developing areas has
become, in fact, a paradigm for industrialization.
The second policy issue, related to the first, concerns the
leadership in these integrative systems and their perspective
on integration. A small group of political leaders constitutes
the primary agents of integration among most developing
nations. The severity of economic problems faced by these
national leaders in integrative unions, particularly in
Africa, predisposes the leadership to seek immediate and
dramatic gains from integration. Since this leadership is
nationally based, it tends to evaluate gains form integration
in national terms. A consequence of this pragmatic approach to
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economic union is that is reinforces a tendency to measure the
utility of sacrificing national options and freedom of action
against tangible rewards. Thus, political and economic factors
become so closely intertwined they cannot be disentangled. In
fact, many of the economic problems involved in integration
can be solved only through political measures. The development
and orientation of regional trade; the maintenance of full
employment; the regulation of cartels and monopolies; the
prevention of depression and inflation; and the coordination
of regional economic plans--all this necessarily requires
legal provisions, executive decisions, and administrative
harmony which fall within the responsibility of the highest
spheres of government. (Asante: p.142)
Turning our attention back to ECOWAS, we find that although
almost every detail of West African economic integration
envisaged in the Lagos Treaty requires bold political
decisions and the coordination of economic and political
policies, none of the 64 articles of the ECOWAS Treaty makes
any explicit mention of political considerations. It becomes
quite evident that authors of the Treaty deliberately tried to
refrain from any emotional national conflict through the
provision of the unanimity decision-making rule and avoidance
of granting supranational powers to community institutions.
Given the wide divergence of national economic policies and
philosophies of member states, it is difficult to imagine how
ECOWAS proposes to achieve industrialization and promote a
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fair and equitable distribution of gains without the
establishment of any supranational integrative institutions.
So long as member states retain their political sovereignty,
the investment climate would normally reflect national
interests and goals. Conflicts within ECOWAS will continually
arise because of competing priorities and interests of member
countries, and the attendant competition in sharing the
benefits and costs of integration. (Endozien and Osagie:
p.20). Thus, economic decisions and intra-regional bargaining
become of major political consequence.
Some of the more important institutions and mechanisms which
could enhance the viability of ECOWAS has been alluded to in
the previous chapter. Although the ECOWAS Treaty gives weight
to the need to promote a fair and equitable distribution of
the benefits of cooperation, it is doubtful whether the Fund
for Cooperation, Compensation, and Development would, by
itself, provide adequate incentive to make the less favored
partners altogether willing to make national development
sacrifices in the interest of overall growth in the community.
The organization must go beyond Articles 25 and 26 of the
Treaty, which simply provides for compensation to be paid for
the loss of revenue from tariff reductions. Designing types of
corrective measures to produce an equitable inter-state
distribution is vital to the survival of the union.
One such corrective measure would be to make sure allowances
are made for countries with relatively low industrial bases to
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adopt some measure of effective protection until their
"infant" industries can become competitive. However, if the
protected activity justified by regional integration does not
spread itself over the regional market so that each country
attracts an equitable share, conflicts of interest are likely
to be perceived. For example, the smaller or landlocked states
may be tempted to pull out of the union and go it alone rather
than subsidize the infant industries of neighboring states.
Nevertheless, the experience of regional groupings in which
the distribution of industry is left up to the workings of
market suggest that regional balance would be an unlikely
outcome.
Ideally, in both a political and economic sense, each member
state should receive at least one key industry that
feasibility studies show it could mass-produce at a reasonable
price. In this regard, the ECOWAS industrial policy and
programme has made provisions for the establishment of at
least one major enterprise in each state whereby other members
would agree to channel their investment funds to other
industries and buy from this preferred producer. But to
compensate for the benefits of development that a country may
forgo by buying from this preferred producer and also avoid
the inefficiencies of monopoly, perhaps there should be an
escape clause in the agreement. (Sloan: p.147) This clause
would state that, in effect, if the region's privileged
enterprise cannot produce it's products at a competitive price
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within a specified period of time, then the other members
should be free either to buy from other sources or begin
producing these goods domestically. Another policy
ECOWAS has adopted which could remedy regional imbalances
refer to the limited retention of intra-group tariffs. In
ECOWAS the less developed member countries are permitted to
assume a slower pace toward full trade liberalization than
their more advanced partners. The net effect of this policy is
to prevent an abrupt loss of tariff revenue until other
compensatory and corrective measure can take effect. However,
both the mechanisms of establishing community enterprises and
limited retention of intra-group tariffs must be implemented
within a framework of an agreed upon regional industrial
policy that involves some planned specialization for new
industrial harmonization in the sub-region.
Although it was announced that an industrial blueprint for
harmonizing the industrial policies of the region has been
worked out, it is unclear exactly what this blueprint entails.
However, it is clear that ECOWAS must avoid at all costs the
concentration in one member country. It may be suggested that
the geographical spread of the community will allow for
specialization along climatic lines. For example, savanna
belts can specialize in slaughtering, cotton ginning, leather
manufactures, and grain processing. The nations in the more
heavily forested areas can specialize in processing of a
particular agricultural product. Cote d'Ivoire can process
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cocoa and coffee most efficiently, Liberia can produce rubber,
as well as Ghana can specialize in timber. Agro-forestry can
support growth in such non-agricultural industries as paper-
milling, furniture making, construction materials, and the
arts and crafts. This would curtail the inefficient
replication of produce in the region and enhance inter-
sectoral linkages.
Since the industries of ECOWAS can be broadly classified
into two categories--the extractive industries and the
manufacturing (including agro-processing), the activities of
both must be tailored to complement each other, which will
result in increased production, marketing, and distribution
interrelationships. One step forward toward industrial
progress is to undertake full processing of raw materials,
even if solely for member countries' consumption. For example,
the abundant iron ore in the region can be further fabricated
to provide the domestic requirements for steel, metal
products, machinery, trucks and passenger cars, containers,
construction materials, etc. Crude petroleum can be refined
into a vast number of derivatives and by-products, including
kerosene, lubricants, and tar, which can be used in road
construction. The methane, ethane, and propane compounds can
be further processed into plastics, synthetic rubber, drugs,
and synthetic fibers. (Ogunsola and Anusionwu: 1980)
Phosphates can form inputs for fertilizer production. The
aluminum derived from bauxite can also provide for a host of
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"downstream" effects. From each set of activities other
complexes can develop which can have stimulating effect on
throughout the economy.
A possible guiding principle for development of resource
based industries in ECOWAS can be to ensure that material from
the region (i.e. phosphate rocks, iron ore, bauxite,
petroleum, etc.) are, as much as possible, not exported in the
crude state but instead should form the basis of industrial
cooperation and development within the community. What is
being suggested is that ECOWAS should embark on an
industrialization path which would not only supply them with
consumer goods, but also intermediate and capital goods.
One alternative which could complement the intra-community
specialization mentioned above would be for the larger,
industrially advanced member countries to provide the capital-
intensive goods while the smaller ones supply consumer
products. At the same time, a complementary industrial
structure can be introduced in certain key industries such as
transportation and steel. The location of these industries
would be the subject of intense bargaining among member
states. It's practicability, however, would require either a
cooperative and sustained planning effort on the part of the
planning agencies of member countries, or the establishment of
an ECOWAS institution which would aim to promote the
integration of member states in the context of rational
specialization, the formation of inter-sectoral linkages,
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while still taking into consideration the equitable
distribution of investment.
Another aspect of the ECOWAS industrial regional policy
should be to provide measures that go beyond the rules of
origin in regulating and channeling the influence of extra-
regional actors. A starting point for such a policy would be
the need for member states to harmonize their various
investment laws. Where member states compete vigorously
amongst themselves for foreign investment, and a regional
development policy is lacking, it cannot be expected that the
operations of TNC's would result in optimal resource
allocation within ECOWAS. By adopting a regional industrial
policy and related fiscal incentives for all enterprises,
foreign investors who wish to operate within the community
would be compelled to invest in ECOWAS in accordance with the
common strategy laid down by the community. (Robson: p.32)
It should now becomes apparent that the determination of the
appropriate scope and direction for development and
specialization in new industries, as well as the fair and
equal distribution of gains from trade within ECOWAS can not
be left solely to market forces. Considering the diverse
economic endowments and ideologies of the sixteen member
Economic Community of West African States, specialization
subject to the requirement of balanced development will
require a reliance on deliberate, planned efforts on the part
of the institutions of the community in order to utilize
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administrative controls to implement desired changes in the
patterns of production. The economic problems posed by the
integration of West Africa find their solutions connected to
the political means available to the ECOWAS organization.
Political considerations become even more important when the
extent and nature of supranationality embodied in the economic
union is being decided. The degree of supranationality in an
integrative structure often becomes a reflection of internal
political trust that each member state has in it's partners.
Thus, the viability of the organization may ultimately
depend upon whether the individual states are willing to give
up some degree of national sovereignty. ECOWAS must draw on
lessons from other common markets, whose regional industrial
planning was marred by the unwillingness of it's members to
transfer aspects of their political autonomy to regional
institutions. The members of ECOWAS must strive to develop a
community spirit, including a long-term view of the benefits
to be derived by staying in the community against the short-
term costs of membership. The membership must realize that the
very decision to establish the Community and the framework
which it's activities will be performed are as much a
political statement as it is an economic one. The amount of
progress which can be made integrating the sub-region depends
upon the political will to cooperate. Integration will not
work if there is only token acceptance of the idea. Effective
integration requires a long-term commitment, and an
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operational acceptance of the restraints it imposes on
national sovereignty. African leaders must have the courage to
sacrifice their short-run interests for long-run development
goals.
Some skeptics will readily point to the fact that ECOWAS has
made limited achievements in alleviating the plight of the
masses in West Africa as evidence of another failure of
integration in the Third World. It should be stressed that
economic integration in West Africa in itself is not a panacea
for the complex problems of the sub-region. A number of
bottlenecks to development cannot be directly affected by
integration. One such problem is the high illiteracy rates in
the region. Nevertheless, viewed as a policy alternative to
continued reliance on capital intensive import-substitution
policies directed toward national markets which are in most
cases are extremely small, it does hold out the prospect of
important potential benefits. (Robson: 1883a) The
implementation of the ECOWAS Treaty will certainly increase
the power of the economic forces of development, and therefore
worth the energy committed to making the organization viable.
Perhaps a more useful way of assessing ECOWAS is not looking
at what exists or it's tangible achievements, but rather to
examine whether the groundwork has been prepared--albeit
slowly--for more sustained development for years to come. The
general conclusion arrived at given the evidence put forth is
that the ECOWAS countries are firmly set on the road to
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fulfillment of their commonly held aspirations of greater
effective cooperation. The process of community-building is a
long one, and a viable West African integration scheme will be
built only through daily, concrete, national and sub-regional
achievements in the spirit of solidarity and international
cooperation. When viewed in this manner, I think most would
agree that aspirations of ECOWAS will someday in the near
future become a reality.
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